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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this inquiry is to examine the relationship of 
the state to the reproduction of capital. The thesis will consider 
the question of the relationship of the state to capital at the 
theoretical and empirical level, in a case study of urban renewal 
in Thunder Bay. 
At the theoretical level v;e will consider; (a) the relationship 
of the state and capital accumulation; (b) collective consumption; 
(c) the general necessity of state intervention into the production 
of the built environment; (d) the state and crises in capital accumulation 
and (e) urban protest movements. At the empirical level we will discuss: 
(a) a particular state agency responsible for regulation of the built 
environment - the Ontario Municipal Board and (b) The Local State. 
Finally, we will bring these theoretical and empirical analyses together 
in considering the case of urban renewal in Thunder Bay. 
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the necessity of an 
integrated theory of the state which is a combination of both instrument- 
alism and structuralism. The concept of structurally induced instrument- 
ality is offered as a possible resolution of the structuralist versus 
instrumentalism dilemma. 
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There are certain texts v/hich become landmarks in a particular 
field of scholarship. The publication of the English translations 
of Manuel Castells essays, "Is There an Urban Sociology?" and "Theory 
and Ideology in Urban Sociology" in 1976 constituted such an event. 
In the destruction of the myth of urbanism Castells rejected the 
analysis of a city as an independent or dependent variable. Returning 
to these essays I am struck by two statements. 
...what characterizes urban sociology is precisely 
the absence of any clear deli mi nations of its 
real object. (Castells, 1976b:73) 
Thus, while,...There is no field of reality which 
can be termed 'urban', urban sociology has in fact 
tended to tackle two types of problem: (1) relation- 
ships to space; and (2) what may be termed the process 
of collective consumption. (Castells, 1976b:74) 
The production of space and the provision of collective consumpti 
involve two processes; capital accumulation and state intervention. 
The spatial structure of the city is the historical product of public 
and private decision making. The post 1945 period in Canada was 
characterized by the concentration and centralization of capital. In 
the same period state intervention in the accumulation process in- 
creased to the point where state expenditures comprised 40% of the GNP 
These observations raise important questions for analysis. 
First, why has the state increasingly intervened in the accumulation 
process? Second, what is the spatial/material impact of state inter- 
vention? Finally, what is the relationship of the state to capital 
accumulation? 
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This thesis will try to address these questions at both the theoretical 
and empirical level. At the theoretical level we will consider; (a) the 
relationship of the state and capital accumulation; (b) collective consump- 
tion; (c) the general necessity of state intervention into the production 
of the built environment; (d) the state and crises in capital accumulation; 
and (e) urban protest movements. 
At the empirical level we will discuss: (a) a particular state agency 
responsible for regulation of the built environment - the Ontario Municipal 
Board and (b) The Local State. Finally, we will bring these theoretical 
and empirical analyses together in considering the case of urban renewal 
in Thunder Bay. 
Chapter 2 elaborates the relationship of capital accumulation and the 
state at the theoretical level through the classification of Maxist Theories 
of the State into four general types of reduction!sm. We will further con- 
sider the Neo Weberian Theory of the State and a Marxist Theory of the 
State which purports to escape classification as reductionist. The typology 
of reduction!sm is intended as a heuristic device which reveals the limitations 
of particular theorizations of the relationship of the state and civil 
society. The conclusions of this critique will inform our own case study. 
In Chapter 3 we will define and discuss the concept of collective con- 
sumption focussing on the necessity of state intervention in the accumulation 
process. In this context we will critically explain two forms of Marxist 
crisis theory: under consumption and profit squeeze. 
Chapter 4 will begin the examination of a particular state agency at 
both the theoretical and empirical level;. After establishing the legislative 
and legal powers of the Ontario Municipal Board and its historical 
role in the built environment we will discuss the general 
necessity of the existence of such a state agency. This discussion 
will consider the process of state intervention in land use and the 
response of the state to crises in capital accumulation. 
Chapter 5 attempts to establish the specificity of the local 
state in Ontario through the delineation of political, economic 
and ideological constraints on local state autonomy. 
The nature of urban protest movements is considered in Chapter 
6, with a particular concentration on the class composition of protest 
participants. 
Chapter 7 attempts to draw on previous discussion in order to 
provide an analytical framework for the understanding of a particular 
state intervention; urban renewal in Thunder Bay. We consider the 
relationship of urban property capital, the local state, the Ontario 
Municipal Board and the Citizens' Association from the conception of 
urban renewal in 1965 to its realization in 1973. 
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the significance of 
our research for the theory of the production of space in advanced 
capitalism, specifically the relationship of the state and capital, 
the spatial/material impacts of state intervention and the limitations 
of the political logic of the state when applied to the logic of 
capital accumulation. 
CHAPTER 2 
A Critical Evaluation of the Theory of the State 
In order to differentiate the various theories of the state we 
will classify them in terms of four types of reductionism as defined 
by Mouzelis (1980; (1) Agent/Agent; (2) Agent/Structure; (3) Structure/ 
Structure; and (4) Structure/Agent. In developing a Theory of The State 
as Marxists we are interested in the relation of capital and the state. 
Capital may be defined in terms of individual capitalists (agents) or as 
a social relation in which the tel os is the accumulation of surplus value 
(structure). Similarly the state may be defined in terms of personnel 
(agents) or as a formal social organization for the furtherance of existing 
relations (structure). The reductionist nature of the theory of the state 
arises out of the necessity of the assumption that a relationship between 
capital accumulation and the state exists. We will move beyond this 
assumption in our discussion to the Weberian assertion that there is no 
necessary direct relation of the state and capital and conclude with a 
discussion of a recent theory which has been advanced as non-reductionist 
in nature. 
The intention of our critique is to reveal the limitations of par- 
ticular theoretical discussions of the relationship of the state and civil 
society and thereby generally advance our understanding of the state and 
its relation to capital accumulation. The conclusions we draw from this 
critique will inform our own case study. 
Agent/Agent Reductionism: 
Agent/agent reductionism is most frequently associated with the 
analysis of Mills and Miliband. "This reductionism typifies all those 
theories claiming that the actions and policies of those directly exercis- 
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ing state power are invariably subjected to the pressures of an omni- 
potent bourgeoisie constantly pulling the strings behind the backs of 
the politicians or military"(Mouzelis, 1980:174). VJhile not expli- 
citly Marxian, this form of reduction ism occurs in the work of 
urban analyst, James Lorimer, the key figure in what may be termed 
the 'City Magazine' school of urban research, Lorimer and associates 
like Donald Gutstein of Vancouver establish a simple linkage between 
the property industry and the local state. In a discussion of the 
linkages of the property industry to local government in three 
Canadian cities, Lorimer concludes: 
Data about performance (voting) confirms the 
links by property industry and politicians. 
Industry linked politicians were the core of 
the industry's majority group at city hall. 
Policies were instituted which protect and 
promote the industry's interests even when 
these are controversial and conflict with the 
interests of other groups (Lorimer, 1980:220). 
In parallel research design where the voting records of the city 
of Ottawa 1970 - 1972 were analyzed, Goldberg concurred with Lorimer's 
assessment of the local state - property industry relationship: 
"City councils act as the political arm of the property industry" 
(Goldberg, 1974:122). 
In a more sophisticated version of what has been termed the 
instrumentalist theory of the state, Miliband moves beyond considering 
the social class backgrounds of state personnel and the pressures of 
big business to propose a form of 'relative autonomy' for the state. 
Given 'the structural constraints imposed by the mode of production' 
"the state does act, in Marxist terms, 'on behalf of the 'ruling 
class', it does not for the most part act 'at its behest' " (Miliband, 
1977:74). It would seem that to avoid the pitfalls of 'naive 
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instrumentalism*, Miliband has adapted a modified concept of 
relative autonomy from the structuralists (cf. Crouch, 1979:29). 
The initial critique of instrumentalism or agent/agent reduc- 
tionism lies in the portrayal of an external relationship between 
the state and the larger society. In a desire,to avoid economism, 
Miliband defines the relationship of the state to social classes 
as external: 
In reality, there is the capitalist state on the 
one hand and 'monopoly capitalism* on the other. 
The relation between them is close and getting 
even closer, but there is nothing to be gained, 
and much by way of insight to be lost, by a 
reductionist over simplification of the relations. 
(1977:96). 
The external position of the capitalist state of Miliband's 
theory begs the question of the relationship of capital to the 
political. The structural constraints of the mode of production 
remain in the abstract realm of theory and do not inform the 
empirical research. The relative autonomy of the state is thereby 
explained in a purely functional manner. Miliband has realized that 
the accumulation process is not external to state action but is 
unwilling to theorize with the mode of production as an initial 
starting point. The accumulation process may be a constraint on 
political action but it is not 'determinant*. As Saunders has noted 
If the state can act to some extent autonomously, 
then we need to know how to draw the line between 
determination and autonomy, constraint and dis- 
cretion, action and structure. This is a serious 
deficiency in Miliband's work, for it results in 
ad hoc attributions of causality to either those 
in power or to the structure without any theoretical 
rationale (1979:162). 
Aqent/Structure Reductionism: Lojkine's Theory of the State 
In contrast to the instrumentalist concept of the state, 
Lojkine has advanced a theory of 'mediated instrumentalism' 
(Saunders, 1979:163) in which ", . . the instrumental use of the 
state by the dominant class is 'qualified' by the balance of forces 
in the class struggle" (Pickvance, 1977:221)□ Lojkine has rejected 
Miliband's depiction of a united bourgeoisie in favour of an argument 
which emphasizes the dominance of a monopoly capital fraction which 
is engaged in conflict with other fractions of capital as well as 
with the working class. Further, Lojkine develops Engels concept 
of 'relative autonomy' whereby the balance of forces in the class 
struggle may compel the state to act in the interest of other classes 
or fractions of capital in the face of monopoly capital opposition 
(Pickvance, 1977:220). 
Pickvance had condensed Lojkine's theory of the state into 
three axioms: 
(a) The relation between the state and social class is internal. 
(b) State policies reflect the class struggle. 
(c) State interventions exacerbate social conditions (1977:222). 
From these theoretical assumptions, Lojkine derives his approach to 
state actions: "... urban policy is an 'active reflection' of the 
relation between different class and class fractions. It 'condenses' 
and 'exacerbates' the contradictions arising from the segregative 
character of the use of space by the dominant class" (Lojkine, 1972:8; 
cited in Pickvance, 1977:238). 
The reductionism of Lojkine's analysis stems from the empirical 
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implications of the theory. In defining the role of the state as 
essential in maintaining 'the cohesion of the social formulation' 
and the domination of the monopoly fraction of capital an implicit 
tension has been created (Saunders, 1979:165). When the state acts 
against the interests of monopoly capital, these actions are informed 
either by a clairvoyant anticipation of working class protest or as 
a response to organized urban protest movements (Harloe, 1977:29; 
Pickvance, 1977a:244; Saunders, 1979:164). 
In reality, Lojkine does not seem to have much faith in the 
efforts of urban protest: 
Such protests merely result in regulative action 
or even, according to Lojkine action which involves 
no compromise to monopoly capital at all. This 
amounts to a division of urban politics into an 
element based on 'ineffective' class struggle, 
encompassing the majority of urban political issues, 
and a far smaller element based on 'effective' 
class struggle from the point of view of dominated 
groups and their interests (Harloe, 1979:142). 
The state has in essence become a monolith, a mere function- 
ality for monopoly capital (Harloe, 1979:141; Pickvance, 1977a:252). 
In the overemphasis of the economic basis of policy, Lojkine has 
neglected political and ideological issues. Lojkine has overlooked 
the variation in class orientations within the non-monopoly sector of 
the economy. A cursory analysis of urban protest movements would 
confirm that the proletarianized white collar worker often acts 
against the interest of his/her working class counterpart, thereby, 
calling into question the concept of dominated classes as monolithic 
in their outlook (e.g. Bassett and Short, 1980:147). The application 
of concepts such as maintainance of social cohesion, class struggle 
or the clairvoyant 'anticipation' recall the worst excesses of 
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structural-functional ism. Research must specify the limits of 
state action not the party line of the French Communist Party. 
If we are to retain concepts such as the 'balance of social 
forces' to explain cases when the state acts against the interests 
of monopoly capital then to avoid circularity evidence must be 
provided which indicates the relative strengths of classes or 
fractions at that particular historical instance or conjuncture 
(Saunders, 1979:165). 
In accord with French communist party politics, Lojkine has 
attempted to demonstrate the possibilities for an anti monopoly 
capital alliance (Harloe, 1977:27). In an analysis which parallels 
to some extent the work of Carchedi, Lojkine sees a proletarianized 
new middle class developing. These deskilled workers have the 
potential to ally with the working class against monopoly capital 
and the state (Lojkine, 1977:149-50). Examination of urban processes 
such as (jentrification destroy this concept of a monolithic dominated 
class. Workers who have been displaced from their houses by the 
middle class rehabilitation of downtown cores are unlikely to perceive 
the proletarianized new middle class as allies. The discussion of 
intra-class cleavages by Dunleavy further weakens Lojkine's argument 
(Dunleavy, 1979a:7, 1979b:9). Inter class alliances may develop but 
the basis of this alliance is more likely to be if one is a home owner 
or transit rider not one's perception of monopoly capital and its 
relation to the state. 
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Structure/Structure Reductionism: Offe and the Capital-Logic School 
Saunders has identified the third form of reductionism with the 
reconciliation of the managerialist and instrumentalist perspectives 
(Saunders, 1979:174). In this form of structure-structure reductionism 
. the institutional features of the political system are derived 
from or reduced to the 'laws of motion' of the capitalist mode of 
production"(Mouzelis, 1980:177). The theorist identified by Mouzelis 
as representative of this form of reductionism, Claus Offe, has reacted 
to the focus on external variables such as class origins of the 
requisites of capital accumulation by Miliband or Poulantzas to rede- 
fine the direction of inquiry to consider the internal structure of 
the state which filters the decision making process to ensure: 
(a) the elimination of all policies representing non- 
capitalist or fractionally capitalist interest; 
(b) that the "proper" decisions (from the point of 
view of the general interests of capital) are 
taken for the further accumulation of capital; 
(c) that the state policies in favor of capital are 
presented as favoring the general interest of all 
classes (Mouzelis, 1980:177), 
If we assume these selective mechanisms or filters, how do they come 
about or persist? The answer to this question involves the theoretical 
elaboration of the relationship of the structure of the economy and 
the structure of the polity. 
The initial point of this discussion is Offe’s distinction 
between allocative and productive state intervention (Offe, 1975a: 
127-34). The allocative intervention of the state exists in the form 
of infrastructure such as roads or training institutions to provide 
a skilled labor force for industrial capital. This allocative 
intervention which aids in the reproduction of capital and labor 
is inadequate under the conditions of advanced capitalism. The state 
must further intervene by producing commodities and services such 
as housing or health which are unable to be produced profitably in 
the private sector. 
It is in productive intervention that the state assumes auto- 
nomy. The allocative function reflects the external political 
climate but the productive decisions necessary for the long term 
interests of the capital accumulation process may be opposed by 
various fractions of capital. The policies derived by the state at 
this juncture are a result of the aforementioned selective mechanisms 
or filters. Thus, the internal structure ensures a policy decision 
congruent to the necessities of the accumulation process. 
The necessity of increased state productive intervention in 
the capital accumulation process induces a crisis of legitimacy in 
that the class bias of state organization and operation must be 
masked (cf. Habermas, 1975; Haas, 1979:32-5). This masking process 
is attempted through three modes of organization: 
(a) bureaucratization 
(b) state planning 
(c) public participation (Harloe, 1979:146-7). 
Bureaucratic methods involve a logic which is not congruent 
with the necessities of productive intervention. The logic of bureau- 
cracy at best approximates ’rational redistribution' in the case of 
allocative intervention (cf. Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979). When' 
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confronted with the necessity of productive intervention,what is 
required is a market logic which is not available. Thus, the 
productive intervention of the state is inefficient, resulting in 
at best Band Aid solutions and at worst accelerating the crisis. 
Attempts at rational planning fail as the state incurs the 
wrath of capital or fractions of capital or must plan in an environ- 
ment where development is individually initiated. In the case of land 
use planning, the state may provide legislative regulation such as 
zoning or physical infrastructure such as roads but the whims of 
the market may determine that development is unprofitable (cf. Crouch, 
1979:37; Saunders, 1979:177). Planning becomes reactive in the 
absence of state productive initiative which, as was previously noted, 
is in itself ineffective. Further, planning itself calls into 
question the distributional impacts of plans. The rationality of 
a plan may be class biased in that public facilities such as hospitals 
may be relatively more inaccessible to the working class than the 
new middle class. 
The advent of public participation in the state intervention 
process creates a new set of problems. Citizens may make demands 
which delay development or even stop it, thereby inhibiting capital 
accumulation. Public participation may serve as a vehicle for urban pro- 
test movements, thereby increasing rather than defusing conflict (cf. Mason, 
1977; Bassett and Short, 1980:144-8; Kirk, 1980:158-9). 
The intervention of the state whereby individuals are provided 
education, health care - in general social welfare - has changed the 
nature of the distribution of wealth in society. The distribution of 
goods such as public housing or rent subsidies is a political question. 
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Governments can change their committment to ‘welfare' programs in 
response to the political and economic climate of the day. The welfare 
state changes the awareness of the populace as to how wealth can be 
distributed. There is a realization that social distribution operates 
on a different logic than the market and thus, must be legitimized. 
The populace must not become too aware that there is a contradiction 
between 'natural' market distribution and state run socialized produc- 
tion. This context defines the legitimacy crisis inherent in advanced 
capitalism. 
The inefficiences of bureaucracy, the irrationality of planning 
in an economy dependent on individual initiatives and the anti-capital- 
ist nature of public participation combine to undermine these organiza- 
tional strategies. The reactive nature of the state intervention with 
the concurrent failure of internal crisis management strategies cause 
Offe to conclude that state activity "... may be described as 
cautious crisis management and long term avoidance strategy" (Offe, 
1976:415). 
Offe's analysis is useful as a conceptual tool but offers little 
in terms of empirical analysis. The creation of state organizations 
such as the Ontario Municipal Board may be seen as bureaucratization 
or increased state planning with Board policies as selective mechan- 
isms to filter out non-capitalist interests. The Spadina expressway 
case becomes a decision taken against a particular fraction of capital 
in favour of the general interests of capital. This is fine at a high 
level of abstraction but more problematic when one is interested not 
only in structures but how the players got into the positions they are 
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in (cf. DiTomaso, 1973:83). In short, it leaves unanswered more 
questions than it answers. 
As a final variant of structure-structure reduction!sm, one 
must consider the capital-logic school. The capital logic theorists 
reject the institutional focus of 'relative autonomists' which 
over-emphasizes the political instance and begin with the underlying 
logic of the motion of capital. Holloway and Picciotto have iden- 
tified three streams of thought within the capital logic debate: 
(1) Given the anarchic conditions produced by 
mutually antagonistic fractions of capital, 
the state exists autonomously of capital 
to ensure the reproduction of capital and 
existing social relations (Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1978:19). 
(2) The second theoretical position stresses not 
only the necessity of the state as in (1) but 
addresses the question of how the state comes 
to be accepted as a 'neutral' institution, 
a question of the legitimacy of the state and 
its fetishized appearance (1978:23). 
(3) The final approach to the derivation of the 
state begins from not the relationship of 
fractions of capital but from the relationship 
of capital and labor. The necessity of the 
state is derived from the "... nature of the 
social relations of domination in capitalist 
society" (1978:24). 
The essence of Marx's 'Capital' is its attempt to reveal the 
social relations which lie behind the traditional political economic 
categories of value, price and profit. The capital-logic school advances 
the premise of Marxian political economy to derive a theory of the 
state. "Just as the social relations of the capitalist mode of pro- 
duction have given rise to the economic form and the categories of 
political economy, so they have given rise to the political form and 
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categories of political science" (Holloway and Picciotto, 1978:18), 
In their desire to advance the analysis of ’capital' to create a 
theory of the state, the capital-logic theorists have neglected the 
limitations of political economy. As Thompson has argued,'capital' 
as an 'abstraction of political economy' is not 'capitalism'. 
. . . the whole society comprises many activities 
and relations (of power, of consciousness, sexual, 
cultural, normative) which are not the concern of 
Political Economy and for which it has no terms. 
Therefore, Political Economy cannot show capitalism 
as 'capital in the totality of its relations': 
it has no language or terms to do this (1978:62). 
The capital logic theorists have extended Marx's analysis of 
capital to social and political questions which are questions not of 
an economic logic of capital but of the historical logic of capitalism. 
This is the cornerstone of Thompson's argument against those who would 
confine Marxism to the categories of 'Capital*. Engels in his later 
letters provides the basis from which Thompson concludes "... that 
Engels is saying, in effect that historical materialism and Marxist 
Political Economy have failed to find a common junction and theoretical 
vocubulary capable of encompassing both process and structure; that 
Marxism is in danger of being imprisoned within the categories of 'capital' 
." (Thompson, 1978:68). It would appear that the capital=logic school 
with their Althusserian counterparts have created a structuralisra which 
is abstract, obscure, functionalist, and a historical , celebrating 
the death of-man in the reification of Marxian categories. One can 
only applaud the wit of Thompson 
All this "shit" ... in which both bourgeois 
sociology and Marxist structuralism stand up 
to their chins (Dahrendorf beside Poulantzas, 
modernization theory beside theoretical 
practice) has been shat upon as by conceptual 
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paralysis, by the dehistoricising of process, 
and by reducing class, ideology, social for- 
mations, and almost everything else to 
categorical stasis (1978:107f.) 
The major criticism of the capital-logic theorists derives from 
the failure of these theorists to go beyond their 'logico-deductive 
structural analysis' to a historical analysis of specific forms of 
conflict. Class struggle has become "... deus ex-machina to save 
the analysis from,the circular formalism and telelogical tendencies 
necessarily entailed in structure-structure reductionism" (Mouzelis, 
1980:181). 
The theoretical propositions of the capital-logic school are 
useful in terms of question formulation. They allow one to see how 
state intervention such as zoning legislation was necessary to reduce 
uncertainties in the land market or the adverse effects of congestion 
which ultimately were a product of the anarchic conditions of an econ- 
omy based upon individual initiative. The researcher is awakened to 
the relationship of 'neutrality' and 'legitimacy' to the logic of 
capital. Further one realizes that the relation of capital and labor 
is the ultimate constraint on state intervention. The shift from 
classical capitalism to welfare capitalism is one of the adjective not 
the noun. In the end, however, the abstract remains and the linkage 
to empirical questions unmade. 
Structure/Agent Reductionism: Poulantzas Succumbs to 
the Liars Paradox or was it Godel's Theorem? 
Poulantzas located the core of the Marxist problematic in the 
question of the determinant role of the relations of production. If 
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we accept that we are Marxists, we must accept the determinant role of 
the relations of production (cf. Poulantzas, 1979:198f). Proceeding 
from this assumption the autonomy of politics exists only within the 
limitations imposed by the relations or production and is hence a 
relative autonomy. The tension created by the acceptance of the 
determinant role of one factor in a theory which must account for the 
totality resulted in an elaborate theoretical system which is ultimately 
reductionist. 
The reductionism of Poulantzas develops from his conception of 
causality (Goodfriend, 1979:94). At the most abstract level a given 
mode of production consists of an articulated combination of structures 
or levels; the economic, the political, and the ideological. At the 
more concrete level the concept of social formation is Introduced to 
account for cases where more than one mode of production is present. 
The social formation consists of the three structures or levels 
which are "... not to be seen as given essences which enter into ex- 
ternal relations with each other, but constitute an articulated com- 
bination in which each presupposes the other two" (Abercrombie et al., 
1976:511). In defining the relations: of production as, determinant, 
Poulantzas has constrained the relationship of the economic, the po- 
litical and the ideological. The economic orders the relationship 
of the other levels of the social formation and determines which level 
is to be dominant (Goodfriend, 1979:94). The linear causality of 
economism vanishes through the structural causality of over determin- 
ation. 
Poulantzas follows Althusser in defining the economy as -deter- 
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minant in the last instance'. The economy dialectically . , deter- 
mines the determined instances ... in the sense that the former calls 
into existence the latter as a condition of its own existence" (Connell, 
1979:317). The economy orders the relationship of the other parts of 
the social formation and determines which of these parts is to be 
dominant. The simple linear causality of economistic explanations are 
avoided through the 'structural causality' of 'over determination': 
The premise of 'over determination' was that 
different realms of social practice, politics, 
ideology, culture, could not be understood as 
simple one-to-one derivations from economic 
life. Modes of production and social for- 
mations, instead, were complex systems of 
different levels of practice whose relative 
weights varied in accordance with the fun- 
damental nature of the mode of production and 
its stage or develooment. The accumulation 
needs of a mode*of production determined, in 
the last instance, the relative weights of 
different levels of practice, but only in the 
last instance (Ross, 1979:201). 
The economy ". . . determines the limits of functional compati- 
bility between levels, hence their internal variation. This is essen- 
tially a negative determination, since it determines what can not 
occur but not what must occur" (Friedman, 1975:163). Thus, structural 
causality is a form of 'restrictive determination' which retains the 
materialism of the economic and allows for the autonomy which one can 
observe in the political or idealogical realms, albeit the limits of 
this autonomy being economically defined. 
From this definition of 'structural causality', Poulantzas con- 
structs his theory of the state. The essence of the state for 
Poulantzas is its function in reproducing the social formation through 
the maintenance of social cohesion and the renroduction of the rela- 
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tions of production: "... the bottom line for Poulantzas always 
seems to be the stability of the capitalist system, the reproduction 
of capitalist production relations, and the continuation of capitalist 
class domination. Poulantzas' capitalist state is basically a 
vehicle of system maintenance" (Skocpol, 1980:171). 
Operating in its role as system maintainer the state acts to 
organize the dominant class and disorganize the dominated class(es). 
The reproduction of the social formation requires the state to be 
'relatively autonomous' from thedominant classes (Poulantzas, 1980: 
127). The various fractions of capital may conflict internally as 
well as with the dominated classes. 
In order to make economic concessions . . . the state 
has to dissociate itself from the economic interests 
of the dominant classes in order to guarantee their 
political interests, and so has to establish its 
autonomy relative to the dominant classes. Hence, 
in order to preserve the structure, it is necessary 
for the state to express not the power of the dom- 
inant class but the power relations of all classes 
in the conjuncture (Clarke, 1977:19). 
The preservation of the structure of the social formation is 
a determining constraint. The 'conjuncture’ defines the structural 
limitations of conflict within and between classes at a given his- 
torical moment (Clarke, 1977:18). Thus, all conflicts occur within 
structurally imposed limits. It is for this reason that Poulantzas 
can criticize the instrumentalist Miliband. For Poulantzas the 
relation between the dominant class and the state is an objective, 
structural one (Poulantzas, 1976:74). Therefore, the composition 
of state personnel is insignificant. As the state exists within the 
capitalist mode of production, it will be capitalist in nature. It 
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is the form (structure of capitalism) not the content (personnel) 
which conditions politics. The relationship between the state and 
social classes is one internal to social classes and reflects the 
balance of class forces at any given instance. 
Poulantzas' theory of the state has provoked heated debate with- 
in Marxism. Skocpol has termed the theory one of 'political function- 
alism' and Clarke in a polemical response describes it as 'bourgeois' 
(Skocpol, 1980:169; Clarke, 1977:24). In defining the state as the 
guarantor of the reproduction of a social formation dominated by one 
class: 
. . . the state is, therefore, always and 
tautologically the representative of this one 
class, whether or not the political or ideo- 
logical representatives of this class pre- 
dominate in political or ideological conflicts, 
and irrespective of whether this class has any 
kind of reoresentation at the level of the state 
(Clarke, 1977:18). 
Further, individuals/groups become 'agents' of the structure 
operating within structurally defined limits. Power becomes the 
ability to achieve 'objective interests' within structurally imposed 
limitations (Connell, 1979:317). 
The mystifying nature of the structuralist position fails to 
account in a meaningful way for change. If we have 'structural 
limits' this implies an invariant component of the structure. But if 
we have structural contradictions this’implies we have a variation 
which is structurally incompatible. The escape hatch for structural 
causality is in stating that the structure is non-contradictory, it 
is the effects of the structure which are contradictory and eventually 
produce change (Goodfriend, 1979:98-103, 106). 
The inherent limitations of the political functionalism of 
Poulantzas theory of the state becomes evident in empirical ap- 
plications. In research on the New Deal policies of the 1930's 
Skocpol concludes: 
Poulantzas' theory predicts functional out- 
comes of state policies and interventions. 
It offers little direct theoretical guidance 
for explaining why and how failures of state 
policies could occur, especially not failures 
threatening to capitalists. It offers little 
guidance for dissecting the concrete course of 
political and social struggles over time, 
especially not struggles that lead toward deep- 
ening political contradictions as ooposed to 
functional resolutions of crisis through 
stabilizing actions (Skocpol, 1980:172). 
It appears that the movement of analysis from level of struc- 
tural determination to social practices is less problematic than 
Poulantzas theory would allow. In the desire to avoid the excesses 
of conspiracy theory Poulantzas has succumbed to the teleology of 
structural-functionalism. 
Poulantzas fails to answer the question of why the state in 
capitalist society is a 'capitalist state'. The preservation of social 
cohesion and the reproduction of existing production relations by the 
state are axioms not explanation. Connell has cogently summarized 
the implications of this 'apriori' thesis: 
We know the system is capitalist; we have a 
model of it which, because it comes from Marx, 
must be right; therefore, those things which 
the model tells us about must be there in 
reality, or the capitalist system will cease 
to be such. The non-capitalist sector must 
be subordinated to the capitalist, the labor 
process must be subordinated to the surplus 
value producing process, the state must 
present an intrinsic unity, reformist parties 
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must contribute to the organization of 
bourgeois hegemony, the ideological 
apparatuses must function to insert workers 
in their class places, and so on and so forth, 
or the capitalist system will cease to be such. 
It is, indeed, unarguable - given the definitions, 
and a completely closed conceptual system 
(Connell, 1979:334). 
Connell has located the achilles heel of Poulantzas' analysis. 
Through the use of concepts such as relative autonomy or historical 
conjuncture structuralists seem to be able to account for all 
situations. "If the state acts to support monopoly capital then this 
is due to the political domination of 'that class'; if it does not, 
then this is due to its relative autonomy from that class" (Saunders, 
1979:185). 
Poulantzas' analysis developed from the realization that the 
relationship of individuals or classes to the productive process and 
their political organizations, ideologies and actions is complex. In other 
words, a recognition of the fact that miners in Sudbury vote Liberal is allowed. 
The structural holy trinity of the ideological, political and economic in a 
complex interaction has con- 
vinced Sudbury miners that contrary to what their objective class 
location would indicate, it is in their interest to vote Liberal. 
How this process occurs is never elaborated beyond the ritualistic 
incantations of 'relative autonomy', ‘ideological state apparatus', 
'specificity of the political', 'over determination', not to mention 
the monotheistic 'determination in the last instance'. The miners 
are agents of the structure succumbing to the numbing influence of the 
ideological state apparatuses whose liberal ideology has asserted the 
neutrality of the government, made them all middle class not to 
mention anti-communist, thereby, reproducing the existing class relations 
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obfuscated, of course, by their hate of the shift boss, thereby, 
perpetuating the accumulation process which has given them 1,4 
televisions, 1.2 cars and for over 50% summer cottages. These same 
agents after a 'strike' of nine months duration voted Liberal. Why? 
The structures of course - the complex interaction . 
These observations return us- to the question of causality. 
Saunders contends that Poulantzas mistakes causes for their effects 
(Saunders, 1979:146,186). If state policies aid in the exploitation 
of labor, can we infer that this role developed out of necessity. 
This ambiguity in Poulantzas' analysis applies to his last discussions 
of state apparatuses and policies. While acknowledging the chaotic 
nature of state policies in the short term he asserts that in the 
long term state policies serve the interests of the dominant class 
(Poulantzas, 1980:133-5). Why or how this occurs is never elaborated, 
leaving us with a theoretical construct which parallels Adam Smith's 
'invisible hand'. It appears that if this is capitalism and the 
state is internal to capitalism then state policies are capitalist. 
Reprise 
The crux of the problem of the theory of the state lies in the 
essentially contested nature of its assumptions. As a Marxist, one 
assumes a materialist philosophical position which leads one to 
consider that particular relations of production have implications 
for the institutional nature of the state. As Poulantzas has stated, 
one can never be sure that one is right to be a Marxist (1979:190), 
but, if we reject the determinant role of the relations of production, 
we accept that a materialist ohilosophy cannot provide a theory of 
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the state. Why does the social formation have only three instances 
(the political, the economic and the ideological)? If the state 
organizes the dominant class or 'power bloc' under the unity of the 
hegemonic fraction (monopoly capital) is this really any different 
than state monopoly capital theorists such as Lojkine?' Above all where 
is the study of historical process? These are questions - the answers 
of which are fundamental to any real understanding of the state. 
The Neo-Weberjan Alternative: Urban Managerialism, 
Last Vestiges of British Idealism 
The alternative to Marxist theories of the state develops out 
of the Weberian school of British urban sociology as represented in 
the work of Rex, Dennis and Pahl. The urban managerialist thesis is 
based upon two key assumptions: "... that there is no necessary 
relationship between economic classes and politics, and that the mode 
of political domination in modern societies is increasingly and neces- 
sarily bureaucratic" (Saunders, 1979:166). These two principles allow 
Pahl to locate the social constraints on access to urban facilities 
within the realm of the bureaucratic 'gatekeepers' who control the 
distribution of urban resources with the city (Pahl, 1975:201). 
This location of social constraints within the bureaucracy directs 
" . . . critical attention to the malpractices and incompetence of 
local bureaucracies" (Harloe, 1977:4). This isolation of attention 
on the bureaucrats has been developed historically by figures such 
as Burnham, Rizzi and Djilas and has served the political task of 
equating capitalist states and 'socialist' states, thereby, attempting 
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to neutralize the political implications of Marxian based theory 
(cf. Pahl, 1977a). 
The criticism of 'naive* urban managerialism has largely been 
directed at its neglect of the larger system of constraints that the 
bureaucracy operates within (e.g. Norman, 1975; Kirk, 1980; Leonard, 
1982; Harloe, 1977; Saunders, 1979; Bassett and Short, 1980)» 
Urban managerialists examine how 'gatekeeper' bureaucrats allocate 
scarce resources to the neglect of why and how resources come to be 
scarce. The implications of managerialist research correspond with 
those advocated by liberal reformers in Canada. The capture of city 
government by citizens groups is deemed sufficient to end the exploitation 
of residents by the property industry (Lorimer, 1978:247-9). Unfortunately 
as Goldrick concludes: 
They seemed to ignore the real issue - 'that 
conflicts in the living place . . . are mere 
reflections of the underlying tension between 
capital and labour. Governments stand 
between capital and labour shielding the real 
source of tension from view. The surface 
appearance of conflicts around the built 
environment . , . conceals a hidden essence 
that is nothing more than the struggle between 
capital and labour.' By proceeding prag- 
matically, by intuition, progressive elements 
in the reform movement succumbed to a liberal 
temptation and failed to exploit the opportunity 
they had won (1978:39; cf. Harvey, 1976:289). 
At this point, one may become somewhat depressed by the in- 
adequacies of recent theorizations of the state. Alas, there appears 
a glimmer of light in our tunnel of abstraction - the work of Block. 
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The ’Crisis' Theory of Relative Autonomy or How Block 
Read Qffe Carefully in the Light of 0*Connor 
There has been some suggestion that the theory of Block escapes 
the reduction!sm of most of the neo-Marxian theory of the state 
(Ornstein, 1980; Skocpol, 1980). Block recognizes that capitalists 
are not clairvoyant and cannot possibly know what is necessary for 
the reproduction of the social formation - their aim is to make 
profit not social policy (Block, 1977:9-10). On the other hand, the 
'state managers' realize that they are dependent for their security 
on a healthy economy. Crises in the accumulation process translate 
into decreased tax revenue and concomitant cutbacks in state 
expenditure and personnel.^ Further, inflation or unemployment are 
9 
often the source of voter discontent in the liberal democracies of 
advanced capitalism (Block, 1977:15). It is in the reconciliation of 
political and economic necessities that the 'state managers' seek to 
promote an atmosphere of 'business confidence',(Block, 1977:16-17). 
Motivated by institutional self-interest, the state looks toward long 
term socio-economic policy which will preserve a healthy investment 
climate, thereby, insulating state managers from the political un- 
certainly of economic crises. 
As a theory of the state. Block has really only translated the 
work of Offe and Ronge into less abstract language (cf. Block, 1977: 
25, note 3). Offe and Ronge recognize that Capitalism is based upon 
private property and thus, private initiative for productive invest- 
ment (1975:346f.). This represents the initial constraint for the 
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state, in that the state cannot begin directing productive investment. 
Secondly, they explicitly note the dependence of the state on the 
accumulation process and its institutional self interest in promoting 
capital accumulation. Finally, they examine the electoral process 
as a method of disguising the dependence of the state on capital 
accumulation. The liberal democratic politic translates an economic 
failure into a political failure without the realization that the 
state is not the primary cause but an effect of crisis in capital 
accumulation (Offe and Ror.ge, 1975:346-7). 
The theoretical lineage of Block's work and the implications of 
his relationship to Offe have often been ignored or confused. An 
example of the misinterpretation of the Block argument is found in 
the work of Ornstein. We will examine Ornstein's analysis to clarify 
Block's theory of the state. 
The initial point of departure is the position advanced by Offe 
regarding the ability of capital to formulate policy. Ornstein 
criticizes Offe for arguing that capital is unable to formulate 
policy (Ornstein, 1980:24). If capital were to successfully articulate 
policy and strategy would they not be class conscious? I would argue 
that successful strategies and policy making by capital imply class 
consciousness. What becomes interesting in the context of Ornstein's 
critique of Offe is his position regarding Block. 
In the conclusion of his summary of the Block position Ornstein 
asserts: "Of the modern Marxist theories of the state. Block's 
provides the clearest basis for predicting that capital and the state 
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might pursue different policies (1980:25). The pursuit of different 
policies by the state and capital in Block's theory clearly derive 
from a rejection of "... the idea of a class-conscious ruling 
class" (1977:10 cf. Skocpol 1980:182). Ornstein cannot have it both 
ways, if he accepts Block's theory, he must accept Offe's. Block 
himself acknowledges the influence of Offe (1977:25 note 3) and a 
comparison of Offe and Ronge's 'Theses on the Theory of the State' 
(1975) with Block's 'The Ruling Class does not Rule' (1977) would 
clarify the inconsistency in Ornstein's argument. 
What Ornstein has chosen as the important contribution of Block's 
theory is in fact a significant misrepresentation of the theory's 
originality. Ornstein states that Block's contribution is the 
. recognition of the role of struggle between classes (not just 
among anarchic capitalists) in seeking to account for systematic 
divergencies between capital and the state" (1980:25). In fact, this 
is an over simplification of a much more subtle argument. The develop- 
ment of a theory of 'relative autonomy' for Block entails answering 
the question of " - . why, on occasion, state managers actually 
extend state power, even in the face of capitalist resistance, in order 
to rationalize or reform capitalism" (Skocpol, 1980:182; cf. Block, 
1977:15). The extension of reform in the faC'B of capitalist resistance 
is not simply the responses to the stimulus of class struggle. State 
intervention largely expands in time of major economic crises or wars 
(Block, 1977:20). In both of these instances the ability of capitalists 
3 * 
to mount a concerted effort to block reform is weakened. In.times of 
economic crises, the struggles of workers and the political reality of 
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the electoral process may prod the state into making concessions to 
the working class. Block qualifies the nature of reform intervention 
by stating that it must extend the institutional power of the state 
(1977:25). Ornstein in stating that Block and Offe define the state 
as 'externalized from capital' (1980:25) may lead one to conclude that 
they advocate a modified instrumentalism. On the contrary both Offe 
and Block initiate a critique of the focus of instrumentalist theories 
of the state on external pressures and constraints (Offe, 1974:32; 
Block, 1977:8-10). Block's theory may be said to be an elaboration 
of the internal structure of the state which 'selectively' ensures 
that the capitalist social formation will be reproduced. Finally, in 
the recognition Block gives to the fact that not all state inter- 
vention is 'successful' or reform may be withdrawn in the changing 
political climate, he implicitly supports Offe's portrayal of policy 
decision-making as an reactive, ad hoc, 'case by case muddling 
through (1977:25-26; Offe, 1974). 
In an empirical application of neo-Marxian theory of the state 
to the New Deal,Skocpol describes Block's theory as 'elegant and 
powerful' (Skocpol, 1980:184). The major criticisms of Block arise 
out of three arguments: 
(1) Block's theory fails to explain why a particular 
state intervention may fail in its objectives (184). 
(2) The level of abstraction of the theory is such 
that there is no consideration of the constraints 
imposed by existing state structures (e.g. bureauc- 
racies, political parties, administrative structures, 
existing legislation) on the action of state 
managers (:184). 
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(3) The concepts of 'working class struggle' or 
pressure must be clarified through historical- 
empirical research (:185-186). 
Skocpol concludes her critique in general by stating that 
. so far, no self-declared neo-Marxist theory of the capital- 
ist state has arrived at the point of taking state structures and 
party organizations seriously enough (1980:199f.) 
The above analysis of the theory of the state leads to two 
general conclusions. First, a more empirically oriented analysis of 
the relationship of the state and capital accumulation must be made 
and secondly, the state must not be considered as a monolithic entity. 
To address these issues we will examine at the theoretical level the 
relationship of the state to capital accumulation specifically 
focussing on state interventions defined as collective consumption. 
At the empirical level we will consider the heterogeneity of the 
state apparatus referring to the articulation of the provincial and 
local state as mediated in our specific case by a quasi judicial state 
agency. The Ontario Municipal Board. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Accumulation Process and State Intervention 
The relationship of the accumulation process to state intervention 
has been elaborated within the Marxist debate of capitalist crises. 
Wright has distinguished between four general theoretical positions 
which elaborate 'critical impediments to accumulation': 
(1) the rising organic composition of capital (falling 
rate of profit); 
(2) the problem of realizing surplus value, and in particular 
problems of underconsumption in capitalist society (under- 
consumption) ; 
(3) a low or falling rate of exploitation resulting from 
rises in wages (profit squeeze); 
(4) the contradictory role of the state in accumulation 
(state expenditures) (Wright, 1978:124). 
These independent categories may be collapsed whereby the falling 
rate of profit theory and the profit squeeze theory are considered as vari- 
ants of one theoretical position, profit squeeze. Similarly, state expenditure 
and underconsumption theories may be regarded as developing from one 
logic, underconsumption (Greenberg, 1978:177, cf. Weisskoff, 1979:342). 
In considering theories of the state within the underconsumption 
tradition, O'Connor's discussion of the fiscal crisis of the state is 
relevant. 
On a theoretical base largely derived from Baran and Sweezy's 
work on monopoly capital, O'Connor depicts state expenditure as a 
response to problems of surplus productivity and surplus labour 
(Harloe, 1977:23; cf. O'Connor, 1981a:41-43; O'Connor, 1981b:306). 
The welfare/warfare state exists in a milieu of unproductive state 
expenditure which aims to increase demand in the economy while 
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siphoning off capital which could have been used for social invest- 
ment or consumption. "The socialization of costs and private 
appropriation of profits creates a fiscal crisis, or 'structural gap', 
between state expenditure and revenues" (O'ConnPr, 1973:9). 
Not surprisingly O'Connor's underconsumption/state expenditure 
crisis theory has come under attack from profit squeeze theorists. 
Gough rejects the 'law' like nature of underconsumption theory and 
the domain assumption that state intervention responds to malfunctions 
of the economic system (Gough, 1975; cf. Harloe, 1977:23-5). The 
'economism' of O'Connor's theory ignores the impact of class conflict 
on the social expenditures of the state. Gough has rejected O'Connor's 
attempt to functionally relate, social policy, the structure of a 
particular capitalist state and the 'requirements' of the capitalist 
mode of production (Gough, 1980:9). 
In a recent elaboration of his theoretical position Gough defines 
the state in terms of its organization of social reproduction of 
labour. Towards this end the state engages in three general functions; 
accumulation, reproduction and legitimation/repression. The first 
function refers to interventions such as the provision of roads and 
sewers which are necessary for the productive process. The second 
refers to measures such as public education or housing, labour 
legislation or supplementary income. The last general function refers 
to the maintenance of 'law and order' whereby the state tries to avoid 
large scale conflicts while retaining its legitimacy. As in O'Connor's 
typology state interventions may fulfill one or more functions. For 
example, education may be used to provide a skilled labour force there- 
by contributing to economic productivity while at the same time legit- 
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imating the existing economic system. The function of social repro- 
duction assumes the most significant role in 'welfare' state activity 
(Gough, 1980:9-10). 
The application of these categories by Gough avoids crude 
functionalism by his consideration of working class conflict. The 
state becomes the vector of two sets of political forces: 'pressure 
from below' and 'reform from above' (Gough, 1980:9). Pressure from 
below refers to the myriad ways in which class movements together 
with social and community movements demand social reforms to protect 
or extend their interests. Reform from above refers to the various 
ways in which the state seeks to implement social reform which will 
serve the longer-term economic, social and political interests of 
capital, or particular sections of capital. The increasing necessity 
of state intervention generated its own momentum which Gough concludes: 
. contribute to the British economic crisis by exacerbating 
inflation and undermining market mechanisms" (Gough, 1980:10). The 
displacement of tax burdens from labour onto capital when coupled with 
the market inefficiency of social welfare programs aided and abetted 
the development of the British economic crisis. 
The critique of Gough has developed on a number of fronts. Fine 
and Harris locate the weakness of Gough's theory in its 'over-politic- 
isation' (Fine and Harris, 1976:110). In discussing class struggle, 
Gough fails to distinguish between economic, political and ideological 
class struggles - all are reduced to a political manifestation. In 
collapsing state-provided social services which are in the form of cash 
into the category of social wages Gough fallaciously equates two 
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distinct levels. Struggles over wages at the point of production 
are informed by a different logic than the more politically de- 
termined social wages. Gough's assumption that increased 'social 
wages' will result in a decline in wage demands at the point of 
production has produced a tenuous form of political reduction!sm (Fine 
and Harris, 1976:106-108). 
The focus on the reproductive nature of state expenditure 
while interesting conceptually is never really empirically supported. 
Further, if the welfare state exacerbates inflation and undermines 
market mechanisms how does this serve the long term interests of 
capital or even particular sections of capital? Finally, Gough's 
discussion of the profit squeeze crisis induced by the market inef- 
ficiences of social expenditures and the ability of workers to resist 
taxation has no empirical basis (Hawley, 1980:128-130). 
The political implications of Gough's analysis are somewhat 
distasteful. By fallaciously equating wage struggles with inflation 
Gough has forgotten that wages are determined by the accumulation 
process not vice versa. From a neo-Ricardian position which is in 
vogue within established European communism, Gough portrays a direct 
relationship between wage increases and the fall in the rate of profit. 
This type of analysis has supported political positions of 'austerity' 
whereby conservatives and 'radicals' agree that public spending is 
excessive and wage increases cause inflation (cf. Mandel, 1978:126-130). 
The location of the economic crisis in the process of distribu- 
tion is sharply rebuked in the analysis of Aronowitz and Mandel (Chorney 
and Hansen, 1980:72). The working class 'concessions' of the welfare 
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state were not entirely the product of class struggle, rather, 
social welfare policy measures exist to absorb the surplus capital 
of commodity over-production. As the 1970's have progressed the 
economic crisis of capitalism is now one of accumulation itself. 
"What was established by the state to 'realize' capital must now be 
restructured by the state to 'rationalize' capital" (Chorney and 
Hansen, 1980:73). Given that social welfare programmes are predicated 
primarily on the 'health' of...(rapid expansion of production, incomes 
and capitalist profits of the economy and were ". . never established 
wholly as a legitimating strategy in response to class based opposition 
(Chorney and Hansen, 1980:73) the whole of Gough's analysis is called 
into question. Perhaps this explains why no legitimation crisis has 
arisen in the face of rationalizing cutbacks in any of the advanced 
capitalist economies - but we must beware of the economic determinism 
implicit in the above critique and hastily refer to the political 
culture of a given country as a significant factor in the question of 
legitimation. 
In Gough's desire to escape O'Connors functionalist economism 
he has appealed to the concepts of 'class struggle' and 'relative 
autonomy'. However, as Hawley has asserted there is ". . a large 
gap between Gough's explicit theory of the state and the actual 
political workings of a specific state" (Hawley, 1980:125). Once again 
there is a failure of the linkage of abstract theory and empirical data 
At the theoretical level the capital logic school has criticized 
Gough for failing to realize that the constraints class conflict 
imposes on state intervention derive from the logic of capital which 
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is a social relation not merely an economic one (Holloway and 
Picciotto, 1978). The displacement of an economic 
crisis into the realm of political legitimacy disappears in the 
realization that the laws of capital are inherent in the political 
and economic sphere: ’’ . the task is not to develop 'political 
concepts' to complement the set of 'economic concepts' but to develop 
concepts of capital in the critique not only of the economic but also 
of the political form of social relations" (Holloway and Picciotto, 
1978:4). The debate concerning the fiscal crisis has been lost in 
abstract verbiage as writers fire salvos of 'economism', 'functional- 
ism', and 'reductionism'. One can only concur with 
von Braunmuhl in concluding: "The most suitable way to achieve . 
conceptual clarification . . would seem to be through historical 
analysis informed and accompanied by systematic reflection" (von 
Braunmuhl, 1978:167). 
If we 'abstract' ourselves from the internecine conflict of neo- 
Marxian intellectual warfare and reflect we may find ourselves con- 
sidering the apparent anarchy of state intervention. 
One has reached the crux of the dilemma of the state. Economic 
constraints limit the possibilities of intervention and yet " 
there is, logically, nothing to stop any particular state from adopting 
a course of action which would lead to its own destruction, just as 
there is nothing to stop a company from going bankrupt through failing 
to observe market constraints" (Scott, 1979:152). The avoidance of 
the implications of this statement exist in mechanisms of selectivity 
which filter out interests and policy which threaten the capitalist 
- 37 - 
system. These mechanisms of selectivity are institutional arti- 
facts of trial and error response. The state responds to problems 
such as congestion or population density with policy such as zoning 
or rapid transit which succeed or fail in the political and economic 
climate of the day. These policy responses reflect the interests 
of capital and thus through their success and survival become histor- 
ical artifacts of class bias (Scott, 1979:152-157; Hirsch, 1978:100-101). 
The state apparatus becomes: 
a heterogeneous conglomerate of only loosely- 
linked part-apparatuses . Already from this 
it follows that under capitalist conditions, 
there can be no unified interventionist strategy, 
let alone, ^a consistent political planning, but 
that state intervention necessarily consists of 
a heterogeneous conglomerate of individual bundles 
of measures . . . The programme of unprincipled 
'muddling through' is therefore also not to be 
understood as the peculiarity of a particular 
political party but is inherent in the system 
(Hirsch, 1978:101). 
The state has assumed a reactive role in which questions of rationality 
of action lack criteria for evaluation. The state is imposing a 
particular order on the 'system' through intervention, an order which 
is class biased in terms of social impact and yet our analysis of 
this order can only be comparative to alternative impositions of 
order. We seem to be captured in a paradox of order: "Although what- 
ever is, is inevitably ordered, if there is to be order, there must be 
that which is relatively without order" (Weiss, 1968:15). 
All this analysis and yet we are left to consider the state inter- 
vention as institutionalized trial and error and state policy merely as 
'muddling through'. Somehow one might think that 'muddling through' will 
never approach the piety of 'relative autonomy'. 
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State Intervention in the Urban System: Castells* 
Concept of Collective Consumption 
The discussion of collective consumption by Castells is useful 
as a theoretical bridge in the examination of a particular historical 
example of a collective consumption expenditure in a city. Castells 
provides us with a more empirically based set of concepts to examine the 
question of state intervention and its relationship to capital accum- 
ulation. Castells' conceptual framework was an explicit response to 
the earlier urban sociology of the Chicago School which has taken capital 
accumulation as given. 
The redefinition of the theoretical object of urban sociology 
by Castells has involved locating the specificity of the city or 
urban unit in the reproduction of labour power (Castells, 1977:236-7). 
The accumulation of capital takes place on a spatially extended scale. 
Through the medium of money and credit one can trade stocks or 
speculate in commodity futures on a world scale. Production is dis- 
aggregated such that the components of an automobile may be produced 
in three or more spatial locations. In contrast, consumption which is 
largely comprised of the reconversion of money wages into the means 
of subsistence by workers is spatially concentrated. These spatial 
concentrations of labour power are referred to as urban units and are 
to " . the process of reproduction what the companies are to the 
production process" (Castells, 1977:236-7). 
The concentration and centralization of capital have resulted 
in a parallel concentration of labour power and the means of reproduc- 
ing labour power. Advanced capitalism has been characterized by 
state intervention into the reproduction of labour power. This is the 
essence of the concept of collective consumption. The reproduction 
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of labour power increasingly involves the creation by the state of 
socially necessary facilities such as medical clinics or public 
transportation systems which are collectively consumed. This form 
of state intervention politicizes the question of labour reproduction 
and thereby creates new sources of social inequality and new opportun- 
ities for social movements. 
The significance of Castells'argument derives from the recognition 
that in advanced capitalism 'contradictions' other than the primary 
antagonism of capital and labour can be sources of social movements 
and hence social change. One might find a parallel in the discussions 
surrounding domestic labour and its role in the reproduction of capital 
accumulation. 
Castells' introduction of the concept of collective consumption 
as a new theoretical object for urban sociology has generated much 
controversy. Bassett and Short refer to the concept's 'relatively 
unrefined state' and lack of integration into " . .a wider theory 
of the state and urbanization process" (Bassett and Short, 1980:205). 
Referring to our previous discussion of the theory of the state 
and the accumulation process we will attempt to clarify the definition 
of collective consumption and thereby advance our argument. 
The prelude to any specific analysis of a theory of state inter- 
vention requires an examination of assumptions at the most abstract 
level. Castells asserts that in advanced capitalism "... the key 
problems are located at the level of the realization of surplus 
value"(Castells, 1975:294). Castells locates the source of economic 
crises in the sphere of the circulation of commodities; capital cannot 
sell what is produced. According to Wright's typology of variants 
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of crisis theory ttiis argument is a form of underconsumption theory. 
State intervention resolves this realization failure by increased 
expenditures on goods and services. Castells specifies the type of 
expenditures undertaken by the state as those " . which are less 
profitable (from the point of view of capital) but necessary for the 
functioning of economic activity and/or the appeasement of social 
conflicts" (Castells, 1978:18). State interventions lessen the cost 
of reproducing labour power, (e.g. public housing) while at the same 
time represent investments of capital at a loss or devalorized capital 
which counteracts the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Castells, 
1978:18f). 
Thus the process of consumption whereby labour power is reproduced 
and surplus value realized has become socialized by state intervention 
and is thereby collective consumption. The question for analysis is: 
Why does the state intervene in the process of reproducing labour power? 
Castells provides both an economic and political response to the 
question of the why of state intervention. If the major economic 
problem of advanced capitalism is the realization of surplus value, 
then state intervention through the purchase and consumption of 
commodities will temporarily provide a solution to this crisis of under- 
consumption. The specific areas of intervention will be determined 
by the average rate of profit. Commodities which are 'socially necessary' 
for the reproduction of labour power but unable to be produced by 
capital at the average rate of profit will be produced as collective 
consumption by the state. 
The social necessity of a particular commodity is a political 
question. Therefore a commodity such as housing may be produced 
both by the state and capital depending upon particular historical 
circumstances. Further, the state itself is financially constrained 
In its ability to intervene in the area of labour reproduction by 
the limits of state revenues. 
The critique of Castel1 s'analysis of collective consumption may 
begin with his initial assumptions concerning the realization crisis 
of advanced capitalism. As an underconsumption theorist he makes the 
implicit premise that individual consumption provides the solution 
to economic crises (Weeks, 1977:284). The failure of capital to 
realize the surplus value embodied in commodities is the effect, not 
the cause of economic crises. Castells has failed to consider that 
production proceeds the circulation of commodities and is hence ante- 
cedent to any realization problems (cf. Marx, 1977:414f.). Any theory 
of economic crises must begin in the sphere of production. 
The second criticism of Castells derives from his emphasis on 
consumption. While deriving the general necessity of state inter- 
vention from the failure of capital to provide commodities which are 
socially necessary for the reproduction of labour power he neglects 
the economic constraints of the state itself. The endemic crises of 
advanced capitalism must ultimately affect the ability of the state 
to raise revenues. With the onset of a fiscal crisis of the state, 
the social necessity of particular forms of intervention become a 
moot political question. The historical response of the state to its 
own fiscal crisis has been a cutback in expenditures particularly in 
the area of collective consumption as defined by Castells. 
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Finally, Castells has explicitly neglected the relation- 
ship of the state to the reproduction of the 
means of production (Castells, 1977:460). In the last instance 
without a reproduction of the means of production,wi11 there be a 
necessity to reproduce labour power? If capital has shut down, what 
impact will this have on the reproduction of labour power? These 
are questions which can only be answered by historical analysis. 
We have examined the relationship of the state and capital 
accumulation at the abstract level of the mode of production. 
Castells’ analysis of collective consumption specified the relation- 
ship of the state to the reproduction of labour power within the 
city. In order to draw these themes together it is necessary 
to introduce the consideration of a particular historical case. 
The Ontario Municipal Board is a specific agency within the state 
which was developed in response to problems inherent in capital 
accumulation within the urban unit or city. The activities of the 
Board provide a historical basis for our evaluation of the validity 
of theoretical assertions discussed in previous chapters and prelude 
our analysis of a specific state intervention, urban renewal. 
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CHAPTER 4 
State Intervention in Land Use Planning: 
The Ontario Municipal Board 
In the Grundrisse Marx discusses the costs of the circulation 
of commodities, specifically those costs involved in transportation 
and communication (Marx, 1973:524-533). At particular historical 
instances means of communication and transport become "a condition 
for production based on capital" (Marx, 1973:525). However, in order 
for capital to produce the means of transportation and communication 
these commodities must be able to be exchanged on the market for 
the realization of surplus value and hence profit. "Capital as 
such...will produce roads only when the production of roads has be- 
come a necessity for the producers, especially for productive capital 
itself; a condition for the capitalist's profit making" (Marx, 
1973:530). Thus roads and other forms of infrastructure necessary 
for the circulation of commodities and hence the reproduction of 
the capitalist mode of production which cannot be produced by capital 
at a profit must be produced out of deductions from the general social 
revenue by the state (Marx, 1973:531). Marx did not forsee the 
necessity of state intervention in the production of infrastructure 
in all historical periods. He assumed that at some point which he 
termed the "highest development of capital" all the general conditions 
of the social process of production would be undertaken by capital 
as all needs would be satisfied through the exchange form (Marx, 
1973:530). We may conclude that the general necessity of state inter- 
vention in land use derives from the inability of capital to produce 
the general conditions of the process of social production. 
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The forms that this intervention takes may be divided into two 
general categories: 
(a) interventions which are necessary to the social process 
of production to reproduce capital and; 
(b) interventions which are necessary to the social process 
of production to reproduce labour power. 
An example of state interventions which are necessary to the repro- 
duction of capital are roads, sewers and other physical infra- 
structure necessary for the production and circulation of com- 
modities. State-produced housing or hospital facilities represent 
examples of interventions which act to reproduce labour power. 
In the case of interventions which are necessary to the social 
process of production to reproduce capital the criteria for state 
intervention is unambiguous - can a use value which is essential 
to capital accumulation be produced by capital at a profit? 
However, the question remains as to who decides which use values 
are essential for the reproduction of capital. Further, by what 
method can we assess the profitability of producing a particular 
use value? Finally, historical circumstances change thereby altering 
the conditions of accumulation such that what was once profitable may 
be unprofitable and vice versa. 
These problems are reflected in Offe's discussion of productive 
state activity (Offe, 1975). The irreconcilable contradictions of 
defining the essence of capital reproduction at the level of the 
particular case result in a depiction of the state as responding in 
an ad hoc manner to shifting perceptions of what is necessary to 
reproduce capital. 
Political decisions regarding the reproduction of labour power 
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are equally problematic. We return to our earlier discussion of the 
Theory of The State where we concluded that it is difficult to define 
the limits of state activity. We can appeal to the traditional 
Marxist categories of class struggle and assert that state inter- 
vention is a function of the class struggle. Our only recourse to 
the empty rhetoric of class struggle is the examination of a par- 
ticular case of state intervention. It is to this end that our efforts 
are directed. 
At the abstract level we deduced following Marx's argument in the 
Grundrisse that the general necessity of state intervention in land 
use derives from the inability of capital to produce the general 
conditions of the process of social production. Thus the structure 
and policies of the state apparatus which regulate, land use should 
reflect historically what the state has defined as failures of 
capital to reproduce the general conditions of the process of social 
production. 
The state apparatus which regulates land use in Ontario is the 
Ontario Municipal Board. The Ontario Municipal Board was preceeded 
by the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board which acted to regulate 
railways, municipal assessments, debentures and annexations (Ontario 
Railway and Municipal Board, 1906). 
The inability of capital to provide the social conditions for 
production such as roads or other forms of infrastructure has nec- 
essitated state intervention in land use. These interventions which 
act to reproduce capital are reflected in the state apparatus created 
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in Ontario.to regulate land use. 
The Ontario Municipal Board was proceeded by the Ontario Rail- 
way and Municipal Board which as is indicated in its title acted 
to regulate the major means of transport and communication of that 
particular period as well as municipal assessments, debentures, and 
annexations.(Hefferon, 1972:2). The major form of state intervention 
which impacts dponiboth the reproduction of capital and the reproduction 
of labour was zoning. 
The logic of capital accumulation whereby individual capitalists 
are driven to compete has particular spatial implications. The city 
becomes concentrated and congested as capital seeks to tap economies 
of scale, external economies and agglomeration economies. This 
concentration and congestion resulted in problems of public health, 
sanitation, fire protection, environmental pollution and overcrowding. 
The state responded to the imperfections of land use with zoning 
legislation which was aimed at reducing externalities such as con- 
gestion and aiding capital accumulation.through the efficient allocation 
of infrastructure (Bason: 198Q-1. The development of urban kind 
by this fusion of private and public initiative defines the spatial 
structure of the city as a system of "collectively produced dif- 
ferential location advantages" (Scott and Reweiss, 1977:20). 
Thus any effort by the state to improve accessibility, for example 
by constructing a new expressway, or reducing an externality such as 
the emissions of a paper mill immediately increases the value of 
adjacent land for its owners. This increase or decrease in land 
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value for an individual land owner through the action of the state 
is central to the analysis of state intervention in the land market. 
With the expansion of capital accumulation in Canada during the 
early twentieth century state expenditures for the provision of 
physical infrastructure to reproduce capital and social services to 
reproduce labour increased (Russell, 1982). With the onset of 
the general crisis of accumulation represented by the world depression 
of 1929 the state in general and the local state in particular exper- 
ienced a fiscal crisis. In 1932 19.1% of Ontario municipalities were 
in default (Holman, 1956:42). The response from the province was a 
decisive move towards fiscal centralization. 
In 1932 the Ontario Municipal Board Act came into effect. The 
0MB was given drastic powers of fiscal and administrative control 
over the local state. This legislation acted to reduce local councils 
to mere agents of the 0MB (Holman, 1956:28). The emergency inter- 
vention and extension of the power of the provincial state represents 
a qualification of Block's theory of the state. Not only can state 
intervention act against the interest of capital, but in times of 
crisis the state may act to centralize state power. The 0MB during 
the depression stabilized local finances and promoted a policy of 
increasing municipal interest rates to attract capital investment. 
The 'watchdog' role assumed by this arm of the provincial state created 
■a more secure economic climate thereby enhancing business confidence. 
This centralization of fiscal and administrative control which 
occurred during the Depression is retained in the present legislative 
framework for land use planning. The Planning Act legally defines the 
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division of state power concerning state intervention in land uses 
in Ontario, The overwhelming conclusion is that the key state 
apparatus in local land use planning is not the local state but the 
Ontario Municipal Board. 
The Ontario Municipal Board's jurisdiction and function are 
established in the Ontario Municipal Board Act, R.S.O., 1980, Chapter 
323. The duties of the Board are not limited to those in the Mun- 
icipal Board Act' but extend to other statutes of particular relevance 
to our discussion:the Municipal Act and the Planning Act. 
The Board's jurisdiction has been divided into 5 major categories: 
(1) Constitution, Boundary Revision and Dissolution of 
Municipalities; 
(2) Approval of Capital Undertakings and the Imposition 
of Rates and Levies to Recover the Cost thereof; 
(3) Approval of Restricted Area By-laws, Official Plans 
and Plans of Subdivision; 
(4) Assessment Appeals; and 
(5) Miscellaneous Appeals (Ontario Municipal Board, 1976:7), 
The Board recognizes that as an administrative tribunal with this wide 
jurisdiction it has largely supplanted the role of the Province with 
respect to local matters. 
Thus all financing, servicing and planning of the local state 
must be approved by the Ontario Municipal Board. The Board asserts 
that it is "...not a department of Government but a tribunal exercising 
a wide variety of jurisdiction with respect to municipalities" (Ontario 
Municipal Board, 1976:5). 
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Planning may be divided into two major functions, policy making 
and regulations. The primary municipal planning policy is the Official 
Plan. Regulatory planning is implemented through zoning and develop- 
ment control. Underlying the planning process is the capital budget 
of the municipality. The Ontario Municipal Board has the right to 
approve both the capital requirements of planning policy and the 
regulatory instruments necessary for the implementation of the plan. 
The critics of the municipal planning system concur in their argument 
that there is an excessive amount of provincial intervention in the 
municipal planning process (Jaffary and Makuch, 1977, Comay, 1977, 
Bossons, 1978, Hefferon, 1972). 
The municipality submits the Official Plan to 
the Minister,who may approve the policy or delegate his decision 
making power to the Ontario Municipal Board. Regulatory instruments 
such as zoning by-laws are submitted directly to the Board for approval 
(The Planning Act R.S.O. 1970). If objections to the Official Plan 
or zoning by-laws are raised, a hearing of the Board is required 
(Planning Act R.S.O. 1970, section 35(221). If the objectors are not 
satisfied with the Board decision they may appeal to the Lieutenant- 
Governor in Council (Ontario Municipal Board Act, R.S.O. s. 94). 
All capital expenditures which require the issuance of debentures 
or costs in subsequent years must be approved by the Board (Ontario 
Municipal Board Act, R.S.O., 1970, s. 64). Further, municipalities 
cannot incur debt without the consent of the electors (Municipal Act, 
R.S.O. 1970, Ch. 323, s. 293) but this requirement may be dispensed with 
by the Board under section 63 of the Municipal Board Act. Thus, 
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opponents of capital expenditures of the local state may file 
objections with the Board and require a hearing on the matter. 
The requirement of Board approval allows objectors to call into 
question not only the level of expenditure but also the object of the 
expenditure, for example, urban renewal. However, this requirement re- 
inforces the subservience of the local state to the decisions of 
the Provincial state. 
The Board acts in an appellate function requiring those parties 
who object to the decisions of the local state to demonstrate that, 
"...Council's action was not clearly for the greatest common good, 
that it created an undue hardship, that some private right was unduly 
interfered with or denied, that Council acted arbitrarily on in- 
correct information or advice or otherwise improperly" (G. J. Smith, 
1979:11). 
Those who object to the decisions of the local state face a 
significant barrier in demonstrating that the Council acted on in- 
correct or inadequate information or advice. The record of Council 
proceedings and planning board meetings is absent and the local state 
managers are unlikely to voluntarily refuse the full record of its 
information and advice particularly if the advisors support the 
position of the objectors ( G. J. Smith, 1979:12). 
The Supreme Court of Canada has established that citizens have the 
right of a hearing with regard to planning decisions which affect 
them. This right of hearing in Ontario is at the Ontario Municipal 
Board not the local council (Makuch, 1976:30). We may infer that 
the Supreme Court has decided that local decisions are in reality 
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made at the Municipal Board level. The political responsibility 
of the local state is supplanted by the Board's ability to act as 
"City Council and Supreme Court" in reexamining and even replacing the 
decisions of the local state (Makuch, 1976, c.f. Hefferon, 1972). 
Any systematic analysis of Board decisions is hindered by the 
fact that the Board is judicially restrained from relying on pre- 
cedent to make its decisions (Hopedale Developments Limited and 
Oakville, 1965:259). Further, Board proceedings are not recorded 
and the written decisions of the Board include findings of fact but 
not evidence presented. 
Nonetheless two studies exist of Board decisions, Adler's analysis 
of 1964-1966 and McKenna's of 1973. Adler's analysis supports the 
argument that the Board acts to sustain capital accumulation and 
reproduce labour power. Specifically the Board affirms local state 
decisions which generate economic gains in terms of the tax base 
subject to the conditions that these decisions do not adversely impact upon 
low density urban residential areas: 
"underlying the Board's policy is on the one hand, the 
articulated premise that, the occupants of existing 
single family middle class housing need protection 
even against municipal attempts to attract high assess- 
ment yielding projects and on the other hand, the non- 
articulated premise that apartment dwellers of all 
income ranges are less entitled to residential amenities 
secured to single family units" (Adler, 1971:223f.) 
Adler attributes the lack of representation of working class 
interests to substantive and procedural reasons. Notification of by- 
law changes are restricted to property owners within 400 feet of the 
area in question. A second factor which inhibits worker participation 
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arises out of the legal nature of the hearings. The relegation 
of those attending the Board hearings without benefit of legal 
counsel to appearances at the end of the hearing and the discussion 
of issues in legal jargon make participation an intimidating exper- 
ience (Adler, 1971:224). 
The 0MB as a state apparatus developed within the flux of a 
particular historical conjuncture. Mahon has posed the question of 
regulatory agencies in terms of a choice between a 'captive agent' 
or 'hegenonic apparatus' theory. From an analysis of the ideological 
impact of the 0MB legal structure one may support a thesis of 
'hegenonic apparatus but if one examines the 'decisions' of the 0MB 
one may support a 'captive agent' theory. The support of either 
position is reductionist in the case of the 0MB. 
The 0MB developed out of problems in the accumulation process. 
Land use conflicts, congestion problems and other externalities 
necessitated state intervention in the urban economy. The 0MB was 
created to regulate the anarchy of the privately developed land market. 
Crises in the accumulation process during the Depression whereby 
municipalities were defaulting on debts required further state inter- 
vention. The 0MB assumed control over municipal finance. As capitalism 
developed, the necessity of reproducing the labour force required 
additional state intervention, for example, educational facilities. 
Local state finances were inadequate to provide these services and 
thus the responsibi 1 i.ty shifted to the provincial level with a con- 
9 
current loss of local autonomy. In the post World War II period the 
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desire of the state to avoid recession resulted in the Keynesian 
policies which stimulated suburbanization. The 0MB in its decisions 
sustained this particular form of urban development. By the 1960's 
the negative impacts of suburbanization began to appear. The central 
business district had declined with the advent of suburban shopping 
centres. The state intervened once more creating a federal-provincial- 
local urban renewal programme which tacitly required 0MB support for 
local capital debentures, property expropriations and the 'positive' 
resolution of undersirable opposition. In the precarious economic 
climate of the 80's the 0MB is once more the watchdog of municipal 
finance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Local State: An Illusion of Autonomy 
In our discussion of land use planning we concluded that the local 
state was but an administrative arm of the Ontario Municipal Board. 
It will be our intent in this chapter to further examine the institutional 
context within which the local state acts. The overwhelming conclusion 
one can draw is that the local state is structurally constrained 
from acting in many policy areas but that local state actions are 
best understood as responses to these constraints, a relative autonomy 
in which the role of primacy is conceded to the provincial and federal 
governments. 
The initial question we can pose is: what are the constraints 
which limit the autonomy of the local state (cf. Dear and Clark, 1981: 
p. 1)? The constraints on the autonomy of the local state may be 
defined as orginating from two major sources: economic and political. 
The initial political constraint on the local state in Ontario 
is the constitutionally defined subordination of local government to 
the provincial government. The British North America Act which defines 
the powers of the federal government and the provincial legislatures 
accords the province the responsibility for municipal institutions. 
"The legal principle that applies is that because municipalities are 
not sovereign, the authority for their actions must be derived from 
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provincial statutes" (Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan 
Toronto, 1977, Vol. 2: p. 93). As has been noted, this legal prin- 
ciple has been narrowly interpreted such that municipal powers are 
specifically defined in legislation such as the Municipal Act, the 
Planning Act and other statutes. 
The Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto has 
elaborated two implications of the constitutional constraints on local 
governments in Ontario: 
First, municipalities today have very little authority 
to initiate policies independently of the province. 
In the past few years, for example, municipalities in 
Metro (Toronto) have been forced to ask the legisla- 
ture for statutory amendments to sanction simple in- 
itiatives such as providing free shovelling of snow 
for elderly persons, creating bus lanes on major 
roads and funding information centres. Second, the 
scope of municipal decision-making is severely cir- 
cumscribed by statutes which not only state what 
the precise role of the municipality shall be, but 
also prescribe in very specific terms the ways in 
which the municipality must carry out its responsi- 
bilities (1977: p. 95). 
The limited constitutional powers of the local state in Ontario 
are reflected in the restricted fiscal autonomy of local governments. 
An examination of the Tri-level Task Force on Public Finance of 1976 re- 
veals the increasing dependence of local government on senior levels 
of government for financing. In the period 1940 - 1974, the financial 
expenditures of the local state in comparison to the two other levels 
of government had diminished. Local government expenditures as a 
percentage of gross national product had declined from a 1971 high of 
9.4% to 8.5% in 1974. Increasingly, local governments had become 
dependent on provincial transfers to offset the inadequacy of locally 
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generated revenues to cover necessary expenditures. In fact over 
50% of local state budgets derive from primarily (over 90%) provincial 
government income transfers. In the period 1968 - 1973 local state 
revenues increased by 32%, local state expenditures increased by 54%, 
and most significantly transfers from the province increased by 102% 
(Report of the Tri Level Task Force on Public Finance, Feb. 76, Vol. 2). 
However, the increases in provincial grants to the local state cannot be 
expected to sustain this growth rate given the commitment of the 
provincial government to fix the increase in transfers to the growth 
rate of Ontario's total revenues (11.7% in 1974) (Report of the 
Provincial-Municipal Grants Reform Committee, May, 1976). The sig- 
nificance of the fiscal dependence of the local state on the provincial 
government derives from the nature of provincial transfers. Given the 
constitutional framework, it is not surprising that over 90% of provin- 
cial grants to the local state are conditional in nature. To receive 
these grants the municipality must comply with explicit conditions as to 
the use of the funds which are defined by the province. Further, any 
major capital expenditures or borrowing must be approved by a quasi- 
judicial state agency, the Ontario Municipal Board, which acts to 
further limit local autonomy (Jaffary and Makuch, 1977: p. 54). In 
this context it is consistent that some analysts conclude that the 
local state in Ontario is not a representative body but an administrative 
agency of the provincial government (Jaffary and Makuch, 1977: p. 52). 
The subordination of the local state to more central state 
apparatuses is a fact of life in most advanced capitalist countries. 
The question remains: given these politically imposed limits how much 
variation exists at the local level? 
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In a discussion of the relationship of British local government 
to the central state apparatus, Saunders has concluded: "The overall 
picture which emerges is confused and contradictory. While it is 
clear that power has become increasingly centralized, it is also the 
case that local autonomy in some areas of policy remains marked" 
(Saunders, 1979: p. 193). The British and French research on the 
local state diverge from the Canadian case because of the party dom- 
ination of local politics. The presence of organized political 
parties allows one to compare the housing policy of Labour as opposed 
to non-Labour controlled local governments - a situation which has 
no parallel in the Canadian context (cf. Saunders, 1979: p. 194, and 
Lojkine, 1976). 
What does emerge in a comparative analysis of local-central 
state relationships is the theme of fragmentation of governmental 
responsibility. This fragmentation of authority between the various 
levels of government has been defined as the central problem of govern 
ment planning by analysts in Britain and Canada. Saunders and Bossons 
concur that the relationship of the local state to the central state 
is inherently ambivalent. Saunders derives this ambivalence from the 
necessity of centralized rational planning where at the same time 
maintaining a local state which is accountable to 'local political 
pressures and social and economic needs' (Saunders, 1979: p. 194). 
Bossons views the planning process in Ontario as necessitating predict 
ability (rationality) and accountability (Bossons, 1978: p, 12f). 
By increasing the powers of the local state and thus political account 
ability, we may lose the regulatory predictability of the present 
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political framework. Saunders views this tension or ambivalence 
as ensuring local autonomy, but, given the apathy of the electorate 
at the local level and the realities of the economic climate of the 
late 70's and early 80's, the failure of local governments to be 
politically accountable will not provoke a legitimation crisis. On the 
contrary, the commitment of governments to cutbacks and 'system 
rationalization' will reduce the political leeway of local government 
further. 
The second major constraint on the autonomy of the local state 
is the economy. The debate which has arisen over the cuts in social 
expenditure in Britain have provided us with one of the most lucid 
expositions of the relationship of the local state and the economy. 
In the words of a Lambeth councillor: 
I don't think it is possible for a council's method 
of working to be fundamentally changed because a 
local authority works in terms of capitalism. Coun- 
cillors are in this peculiar dual position of re- 
presenting working-class people but also of running 
the local state which is part of the central state. 
I don't think you're going to be able to change the 
way the local state operates within capitalism 
(Bowring, 1980:23). 
As an institution within and dependent upon the capitalist accum- 
ulation process the local state must pursue policy which facilitates 
this process. A heal thy local economy means political stability and 
increased tax revenues for local state coffers. Ideally, the local 
state desires to promote development which will increase its tax 
base thereby decreasing dependence on the central state apparatus. 
The local state is fiscally dependent on the central state 
apparatus and the local economic base. Organizations of local govern- 
ments such as the Association of Municipalities of Ontario have 
- 59 - 
militated against the conditional nature of provincial grants to 
local governments with the explicit aim of increasing local expenditure 
autonomy. Given the desire of the local state to decrease economic 
dependence on the conditional transfers of the provincial government, 
it is 'rational' for the local state to assume a pro-development 
attitude. Economic growth at the local level implies an increased 
tax base and hence increased local fiscal autonomy. The 'rationality' 
of this pro-development position often results in a close relation- 
ship of the local state to the land development industry. This 
relationship becomes at times symbiotic, thereby, prompting analysis 
of the 'City Magazine' school which depicts the local state as the 
instrument of the property industry (cf. Lorimer, 1980). This con- 
ception of the state has been critiqued previously and it would be 
redundant to reiterate the argument. 
What is significant in the recognition that the local state 
has a vested interest in development is the observation that the local 
state itself may even initiate change. In a submission to a symposium 
on downtown cores sponsored by the Ontario Ministry of housing, the 
clerk-administrator of the City of St. Thompis stated: 
In conclusion, we must continue to seek means and to 
adopt policies, practices and control which will 
enable us to give support and reinforcement to our 
downtown cores and to initiate redevelopment and 
revitalization where required (New Directions: 
Proceedings of a Symposium on Dov/ntown Cores, Nov. 
1977, B. Barrett: p. 30). 
The Impact of Property Tax Dependency 
on Local State Action 
What little fiscal autonomy the local state enjoys derives from 
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property tax income. In the post-World War II period local state 
expenditures have shifted from services to property to services to 
people. For example, the local state spends approximately one third 
of its income on education. Over 50% of the education expenditure 
is financed directly from property tax revenue (Royal Commission on 
Metropolitan Toronto, Update, Dec. 1975: p. 10-11). Two questions 
arise: 
(a) Who is bearing the burden of property tax? 
(b) How does the dependence of the local state on 
property taxes affect decision-making? 
The answer to the first question is quite simple. The property 
tax is regressive with respect to income. Low income residents in 
Ontario pay a disproportionate percentage of their income in property 
tax, even if we take into account the Ontario tax credit. One might 
reply that the regressive tax is necessary given that low income 
earners consume a disproportionate amount of social services. However, 
as Patterson's analysis demonstrates in 1974, households with income 
in excess of $20,000 were the real winners in the property tax assess- 
ment and all other households were experiencing net losses in terms 
of services received as compared to tax paid (Patterson, 1979: p. 16, 
cf. Report of the Royal Commission on the Reform of Property Taxation 
in Ontario, 1977: p. 5). 
In contrast to the commonly held view that low income earners 
are feeding excessively at the public trough, both government (C.M.H.C.) 
and independent analysis has confirmed that high income households 
are public welfare bums. The 'redistributive' ideology of the welfare 
state is more than a myth, it is an outright lie. The distribution 
of the costs of reproducing the labour force in Ontario are such that 
in a perverse inversion, labour pays the most to reproduce itself. 
There has been some movement on the part of the state to address 
the problem of the property tax. The Blair Commission in Ontario was 
mandated to analyze the property tax system in Ontario and propose 
reform. One of the reform possibilities was a shift to market value 
assessment (Report of the Royal Commission on The Reform of Property 
Taxation in Ontario, 1977: p. 29). But as an analyst has stated: 
From the experience of other cities, it has been 
observed that market value assessment increases 
the share of taxes borne by homeowners and reduces 
the tax burden on commercial and industrial sectors 
unless compensating measures are taken (Royal 
Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, Update, December 
1975: p. 11). 
It would seem that property tax reform is a complex problem requiring 
a reconciliation of political reality and economic necessity. If the 
state implements market value assessment, it will alienate the substan- 
tial home-owner vote. But if the state were to implement a property 
tax reform which was redistributive, it would alienate high income 
groups with political clout and may inhibit private investment and 
reduce corporate profits. As Connell has noted: ". . .the state 
reacts not to contradictions of accumulation but to their political 
consequences." Therefore, we can expect little in the way of redis- 
tributive property tax reform. However, in a society where a large 
number of voters are home-owners, one can expect the occasional polit- 
ical gesture, perhaps a mortgage reductibi1ity tax break, but, the 
extent of this reform is limited in an economy where increasing social 
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expenditure is counter productive. If the state were to relinquish 
the revenue to be gained from tax to mortgage holders without increas- 
ing some other form of taxation or decreasing some other expenditure, then 
one could only hope that the extra income which this tax break represents 
would create the demand benefits of classical Keynesian measures - a 
hope which has not been borne out by history. 
The answer to the second question regarding the policy impacts 
of property tax dependency on the local state is an elaboration on the 
theme of greed. Local state managers may 'rationally' decide it is 
in their best interest to plan to maximize assessment rather than 
achieve specific social goals (cf. Plunkett, 1980: p. 193). It is 
this form of 'dollar planning' which occasions analysts to portray the 
conspiring city politicians and businesses. A more informed research 
would reveal that the pro-development ideology of state managers arises 
out of the structural imperatives imposed by the lack of fiscal 
autonomy, the ideology of capitalist accumulation and the political 
reality of the electoral process. Land developments such as shopping 
centres are sold to the public in terms of tax benefits by local state 
managers who see a dynamic city as the key to success. A 'blighted' 
downtown, declining industrial base or contracting property tax 
revenues make a re-election campaign more difficult for city politicians. 
A succinct appraisal of the distorted rationality produced by the 
economic and political constraints of the local state has been provided 
by the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto: 
While we acknowledge the responsibility of the 
province for the appropriate functioning of 
municipal government, one wonders whether some 
process of partial 'deconditionalizing' - 
might not be warranted. Very often local 
- 63 - 
government places less emphasis on the 
determination of local priorities, and con- 
centrates more on ways of cashing in on 
cent, 20 cent, or 25 cent dollars 
(where the balance is co-shared by senior 
levels) (Royal Commission on Metropolitan 
Toronto, Update, June 1976, p. 11, cf. 
Municipal Liaison Committee, 1976: p. 11). 
It is in the acquisitive pursuit of tax revenue that the local 
state reaches an impenetratable barrier. While corporately con- 
stituted, the local state is not a business corporation. The political 
nature of the state creates a context wherein the 'corporate municipality' 
cannot approximate the logic of capital. In its reactive role the local 
state can facilitate development such as urban renewal but it cannot 
directly undertake this development on a large scale without dissolving 
the private property basis of capitalism. The tensions of private 
initiative/public initiative, development/re-election, local economy/ 
national economy, local state/provincial state provide the context 
in which decisions are made by local state managers. Quite clearly 
the local state is subordinate to the central government; for example, 
urban renewal was a federal-provincial creation. However, it can be 
seen that within these constraints, the local state will tend to pur- 
sue policies which promote development and increase tax assessment. 
It is within the economic and political constraints defined above that 
local state decisionsoccur. The relationship of the local state to 
capital is much more complex than any instrumentalist theory would 
allow. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Politics of Ambiguity: Urban Social Movements 
Classical Marxism defined the major contradiction of capitalism as 
the antagonism of capital and labour. With the entrance of the state 
into the process of the reproduction of the means of production and the 
reproduction of labour power, secondary contradictions have developed. 
Caste!Is sees the politics of these secondary contradictions of col- 
lective consumption as the key to revolutionary political opposition 
(Castells, 1977:464-5). It will be our argument that urban protest 
movements far from constituting a revolutionary vanguard are reformist. 
Castells' analysis of urban social movements is an exercise in the 
creation of a typology. In contrast to traditional research which 
focuses on organization Castells examines the issues at stake which 
stem from the structural contractions of advanced capitalism and the 
effects of the protest or actions of the social movement (Castells, 
1977:270, chpt. 14; cf. Pickvance, 1976). A typology is created by the 
examination of several urban social movements whereby each particular 
movement is defined in terms of the issue at stake, the social base con- 
cerned, the organizations present, the social force constituted, the 
adversary, the claims made, the action taken and finally the urban and 
political effects (Castells, 1977:344). From this typology Castells draws 
conclusions for urban social movements in general. The major deficiences 
of this inductive analysis stem from the derivation of the relationship 
of the social base, organization and social force (cf. Pickvance, 1977:175). 
The social base of an urban social movement has never been 
explicitly defined by Castells. An examination of his typology of 
social movements would allow us to concur with Pickvance in stating 
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that the social base "... refers to the population directly con- 
cerned or affected by the issue at stake" (Pickvance, 1977:176; cf. 
Castells, 1977:344). Pickvance criticizes Castells' conceptualization 
of the social base for the reliance on demographic characteristics and 
the neglect of the 'value orientations' or ideology of those composing 
the social base (Pickvance, 1977:177). The value of Pickvance's 
critique is in the recognition that urban social movements are not 
constituted along traditional class lines and that ideological practices 
are significant in discussing the mobilization of protest. 
The demographic characteristics of a particular social base would 
allow one to locate classes in terms of the relations of production. How- 
ever the intervention of the state in the reproduction of labour power has 
resulted in one's position in collective consumption processes to be independ- 
ent of one's position in the production process. If state intervention 
politicizes the reproduction of labour power as Castells asserts and is thus 
the basis for secondary contradictions in capitalism which foster the social 
movements, then specification of the social base must consider the relation- 
ship of that base and hence classes or class fractions to collective consumption 
processes. We would assume that actions by the state which directly 
affect the reproduction of the labour power of a particular social 
base, for example, the demolition of all housing in a particular area 
for the purpose of urban renewal, would engender an urban social move- 
ment. 
This expectation of mobilization is critical to the understanding 
of urban social movements and reveals a lacuna in any typology. 
Analytically you may specify the significant categories for classify- 
ing a social movement but the relationship of these categories must 
be theoretically specified. In Castells' typology the question of 
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how a social base is transformed into a social force or how protest 
is mobilized remains unanswered. 
If we examine various studies of urban social movements,discussion 
of the critical organization or mobilization stage of urban protest 
remains vague and provides little theoretical insight. For example, 
one is faced with statements such as: 
The Riverdale Community Organization . . . grew out 
of frustration and anger. (Toronto) (Goldrick, 1978: 
34). 
In the late 1960's this subculture merged with other 
social movements of the day advocating more open and 
responsive government, greater attention to the en- 
vironment, and a more humane, livable city. These 
popular movements were institutionalized in the forma- 
tion of a new civic reform party . . . (Vancouver) 
(Ley and Mercer, 1980:93). 
Perhaps the most significant finding in a review of the research 
concerning urban protest is the consistent class bias in organizations 
which develop as the result of specific conflicts. Overwhelmingly 
protest organizations are initiated and/or controlled by the new middle 
class. The following statements indicate the non-localized, non-country 
specific nature of the middle class domination of urban protest: 
A profile of TEAM Leadership in 1969 showed that 
almost 60% were professional or semi-professionals 
while a little over 20% were businessmen. (Vancouver). 
(Ley and Mercer, 1980:93). 
A survey in 1972 of eleven inner-suburban residents' 
groups indicated that their members are predominantly 
middle class and professional ...(Australia) (Sandercock, 1975:1 72) 
The MCM internal struggle, in class terms a struggle 
between two fractions of the petite bourgeoisie wing 
for political leadership of a possible mass movement 
, . . (Montreal) (Raboy, 1978:12) 
The middle class (along-with finance capital) was the 
major beneficiary of urban development, and it was 
ready to forsake much of the individual freedom urban 
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life entailed. But when costs were extracted from 
their own properties, neighborhoods and environments, 
the line of tolerance was crossed. A new bourgeois 
reform movement was launched. (Toronto) (Goldrick, 
1978:32) 
The Barnsbury Association is an amenity society formed 
in 1964 by a group of newly arrived young professionals 
in a traditionally working class area of private, rent- 
ed accommodation, (England) (Lowe, 1977:44) 
The identification of organizations with the 'middle class' 
is problematic. The ambiguity of this conceptualization of class 
weakens the analysis of the implications of class on the resolution 
of urban conflict. Carchedi‘s elaboration of the concept of class 
beyond identification at only the productive level is relevant at this 
point. The essence of the 'new middle class' for Carchedi lies in the 
fact that ". . they are either the exploited or the economically 
oppressed; . . they are the exploiters or the oppressors ..." 
Thus, "... they are partly on the side of capital and partly on the 
side of labour" (Carchedi, 1977:88). The contradictory nature of the 
class location of the 'new middle class' wherein their proletarian- 
ization may cause them to identify with the working class has not 
occurred in the arena of urban conflicts. 
On the contrary, the 'new middle class' has been identified with 
a liberal reform ideology which is defensive, often narrowly self 
interested. This narrow self interest is particularly significant in 
the process of 'gentrification', where inner city working class rented 
accommodation is improved and turned into middle class owner occupation, 
policies of organized professionals in zones which are undergoing this 
form of transition may, in reality, conflict with those of working- 
class residents, thereby, making 'success' of protest a class specific 
The 
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concept. New middle class organizations such as the Barnsbury 
Association in Britain in their pressure for residential rehabil- 
itation effectively displaced working class tenants as property 
values escalated under the increased market pressure (Bassett and 
Short, 1980:147). 
The Barnsbury case is interesting in that a parallel working 
class organization developed at a later stage of the conflict. The 
political ideology and representation of the middle class organization 
in combination with ever increasing property values relegated the 
working class organization to a force of amendment and opposition 
(Lowe, 1977:44-5). 
A further division between working and new middle class organiza- 
tions lies in their ideological orientation: 
Upper and upper middle class people are more 
likely to think in terms of general plans, the 
neighborhood or community as a whole, and long 
term benefits (even when they might involve 
immediate costs to themselves); lower and lower 
middle class people are more likely to see such 
matters in terms of specific threats and short- 
term costs (Lowe, 1966:46). 
The ambiguity of the discussion of urban protest movements derives 
from the nature of the 'stake': collective consumption. Contrary to 
the desire of some Marxist analysts to conflate the politics of the 
workplace and the politics of the community, no such fusion is 
possible (cf. Lojkine, 1977:153). 
The validity of Dunleavy's discussion of collective consumption 
lies in the recognition that one's class position is not identical to 
one's consumption location (Dunleavy, 1979, 1980). This divergence 
creates a non-correspondence of workplace and community politics. 
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VJorking class homeowners may stigmatize fellow workers who reside 
in public housing thereby creating the basis for intra-class cleavages 
or class fractions. 
Further, it is difficult to measure the material impacts of 
particular forms of state intervention. The construction of a 
hospital or school in a particular location may reinforce spatial 
segregation of a class or class fraction. However, the determination 
of the material impact of this locational decision requires a 
sophisticated form of analysis involving measures of accessibility. 
For most people the construction of a hospital is 'good', few tend 
to consider hospital accessibility in terms of class interests. If 
conflict over collectively consumed goods arises it is difficult to 
relate the politics of urban issues to the workplace. One would be 
hard pressed to find evidence of urban struggles which had organizational 
linkages to trade union struggles. 
Two conclusions may be drawn from this analyses. Firstly, it 
becomes clear that collective consumption has divided the working class 
internally and prevented working class mobilization on issues such as 
low income housing. Secondly, the politics of collective consumption 
have been dominated by the new middle class. This domination has been 
reinforced by institutional mechanisms for the resolution of consumption 
conflicts. 
In our examination of the nature of urban conflict resolution 
we focussed on the state and state apparatuses such as the Ontario 
Municipal Board. The 0MB structurally precludes specific forms of 
discourse by virtue of its quasi-judicial nature. Hearings confine 
those not represented by legal council to speak after all other 
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representations are complete. In the instance of a hearing 
notification only property owners are notified thereby excluding 
tenants. Finally, the apellants must always oppose the state or 
urban property capitalists who are represented by both legal counsel 
and/or planning professionals. 
This institutional structure within which urban protest is 
resolved acts to structurally preclude the participation of the 
working class who lack the resources of 'articulation' enjoyed by 
their new middle class counterparts. Even in instances where the 
class base and class interests of a particular movement have been 
working class invariably the leadership consisted of 'new middle 
class' advocates (Fraser* 1972). 
Institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution such as the 
0MB reproduce existing class relationships by structurally precluding 
the participation of the working class. This is not to imply that 
the 'new middle class' can escape the domination of legal discourse 
in advanced capitalism. Our research has demonstrated that urban 
protest movements have been singularly unsuccessful in their efforts 
before the 0MB regardless of their class base. 
The lack of success of urban protest movements may be attributed 
to the nature of legal ideology. 
The original impetus of urban protest movements arises in the 
everyday practices of individuals which we may term "practical 
cognition" Individuals experience conditions such as the building 
0 
of a high rise next door within their practical discourse. The 
impact of the high rise becomes a source of talk. Through talk 
some divergence may be noted between what individuals value or 
define as desirable, perhaps individual privacy, and the proposed 
high rise development. This conflict of desirability is resolvable 
within particular institutional mechanisms, in this case the 0MB. 
Once individuals accept that the conflict must be resolved in 
the legal realm of The Municipal Board hearing they accept that the 
'rules* of 0MB discourse are legitimate. The structural selectivity 
Of 0MB procedures serve to reinforce the hegemony of the existing 
class structure. 
The institutionalized knowledge and qualifications necessary 
to 'articulate' a position at an 0MB hearing selectively exclude 
working class representation. Workers lack the cultural capital 
necessary to perform the symbol manipulation which will sway 0MB 
adjudicators. 
The creation of a particular form of conflict resolution, the 
quasi-judicial hearing, represents the imposition of a particular 
formalized order on speech: legal discourse. Danet has captured the 
essence of legal talk. "The 'fact'-oriented genres publicly claim 
to deal with truth and facts but are actually preoccupied with elaborate 
rules governing the flow gf talk and silence and have evolved a highly 
esoteric professional language, incomprehensible to those whose fate 
is at stake, that dominates the courtroom" (Danet, 19-80:540). 
The success of urban protest for the working class depends on 
the 'delegitimation' of ritual discourses such as legal ideology 
through attacks on forms of formalized speech which restrict what can 
be said. We join with Willis in asserting that; "In a real sense for the 
working class the cultural is in a battle with, language" (Willis, 1977:124). 
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CHAPTER 7 
Urban Renewal in Thunder Bay: 1965-1973 
The initial legislation regarding urban renewal in Canada was 
the National Housing Act of 1954. The intent of this legislation 
was to provide funds to municipalities to redevelop urban land for 
low or moderate cost rental housing projects. If we were to categorize 
the initial urban renewal policy as a form of state intervention, 
in terms of our previous discussion it would represent a state in- 
tervention designed to reproduce labour power. Urban renewal in 
the 1954 legislation would conform to Castells definition of collective 
consumption - state expenditures "which are less profitable (from the 
point of view of capital) but necessary for the functioning of economic 
activity and/or the appeasement of social conflicts" (Castells, 1978: 
18). 
The post war period in Canada has been characterized by cyclical 
recessions. In 1948-49 and 1953-54 unemployment increased and wages 
declined (Bowles and Gintis, 1982:81). Housing policy, specifically 
the construction of new housing was used by the Canadian state as a 
counter-cyclical, demand-stimulating economic measure to ameliorate the 
effects of the recessions. In a period of declining wages and rising 
unemployment the problem of low and moderate cost housing for workers 
was acute. The rate of profit for house building corporations was low 
and private ownership of land represented a barrier to the redevelop- 
ment of the inner city urban land. 
The 1954 Federal National Housing Act addressed the problem of 
low and moderate cost housing by providing funds and legal authority 
for municipalities to acquire and redevelop urban land for. low and 
73 - 
moderate cost housing. 
The declining wages and rising unemployment of the 1953-54 economic 
recession created the classic scenario of an underconsumption crisis. 
As economic demand declined state interventions such as urban renewal 
which acted to stimulate demand through the construction of housing 
temporarily resolved the realization problems of capital. The selection 
of low and moderate rental housing was not accidental as it was both 
a commodity necessary for the reproduction of labour power and one 
which was unable to be produced at an average rate of profit by capital. 
CastelIs' discussion of collective consumption locates the root of 
economic crisis in the inability of capital to realize surplus value, 
a Variant of the underconsumption theory of crisis. Our critique of 
CastelIs centred on his neglect of the production process as the origin 
of crises and his failure to consider economic constraints on state 
intervention. The validity of these criticisms are reflected in the 
historical development of urban renewal legislation. 
The labour reproduction focus of the initial urban renewal policy 
was abandoned as time progressed. The provision of moderate and low 
income rental housing was subordinated to the redevelopment of the 
inner city for more intensive commercial uses. Finally in 1965 the 
fiscal crisis of the state resulted in the cancellation of the urban 
renewal policy. 
;; The initial urban renewal legislation was intended as a grant 
0 
from the Federal government to the municipalities to defray the cost 
of acquiring and clearing substantial areas for the purpose of 
74 - 
providing a low cost or moderate cost rental housing project (National 
Housing Act, 1954:Part III, Para. 23(1)). By 1956 the section of 
the National Housing Act referring to urban renewal had been changed 
from Housing Redevelopment to Urban Redevelopment. Increasingly the 
legislation became a tool for commercial redevelopment with housing 
a secondary concern. What had originated as a policy which acted to 
reproduce labour power was redefined as a policy to subsidize capital 
accumulation. Eventually the fiscal- constraints of the state required 
an abandonment of the policy altogether. 
Urban renewal policy was revived under a new name. The Downtown 
Revitilization Program in 1976. In its new guise its intent was clear, 
to arrest further decline and restore confidence in these (city) cores 
(Report of the Provincial-Municipal Grants Reform Committee: 1976). 
However, it was no longer a pure state subsidy of capital accumulation but 
now represented a shared federal-municipal investment which was expected 
to generate additional property tax revenues for the municipality which 
were to be shared with the province (Stevensen, 1976, p. 169-70). 
History had come full circle, urban renewal had transformed it- 
self from a state intervention to reproduce labour power in a subsidy 
to capital accumulation designed to increase state revenues. 
The impetus for urban renewal was a nebulous substance termed 
'blight'. An urban area must be defined as 'blighted' before the 
local state could apply to the Province for the designation of the 
blighted area as a redevelopment area. The application for the des- 
ignation of a redevelopment area was predicated upon defining an area 
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as 'blighted', within the Offical Plan of the local state. The defin- 
ition of 'blight' within the 'Offical Plan' was established by an 
Urban Renewal Study. Given that the Planning Act does not specify 
the meaning of the term 'blight' in any measurable way, the definition 
of 'blight' becomes subjectively based on criteria specified by those 
conducting the initial urban renewal study (R.S.O. Planning Act, 1960, 
S. 26). 
Having established a particular area as a redevelopment area in 
conformity with the Offical Plan, the City of Port Arthur by resolution 
of Council of July 26, 1965 applied to the Minister of Municipal Affairs 
under $.21 of the provincial Planning Act for approval to enter into 
an agreement with C.M.H.C. for financial assistance in the preparation 
of an urban renewal scheme in accordance with S.23H of the National 
Housing Act; and under S.22 of the Planning Act for financial assistance 
from the Province. The senior levels of government accepted this 
application on October 14, 1965. Words had changed into things so that 
things could change into words. 
The initial urban renewal scheme involved the acquisition, clear- 
ance and improvement of municipal services of lands in the Port Arthur 
central business district. The redevelopment plan entailed little new 
retail and commercial development and was thus not a significant de- 
parture from the existing pattern of capital accumulation in the core 
(Proctor, Redfern, Bousfield and Bacon, Feb. 1968). The market studies 
contained in the report indicated no significant increase in demand 
for retail floor space in the city. 
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One can only speculate on the course of events which followed 
but by 1969 a significant redefinition of the urban renewal scheme 
had begun with the submission of a report to the local state managers 
by the firm W.W. Urban Consultants. The 1969 W.W. Urban Report re- 
commended a more intensive commercial development of the Port Arthur 
core which entailed the construction of 100,000 square feet of 
new retail floor space (W. W. Urban Consultants, Jan. 12, 1969). 
The demand for retail floor space is a function of 3 major 
variables: population, income and consumer choice. By advancing 
alternative projections on the increase of these variables 'experts' 
can calculate the requirements of a particular market for retail 
floor space. The projections of population, income and consumer 
choice variables is a risky and uncertain business. The uncertainty 
involved in these projections allows one to produce almost any result 
desired. This uncertainty factor provided the perfect circumstances 
for state managers to legitimate their decision to redefine the intent 
of the urban renewal scheme. 
If we examine the projections in the W.W. Urban Report of 1969 
the significant increase is found in the category "consumer choice". 
W.W. projectedan increase during the period 1966-1971 of approximately 
50% in the amount consumers would choose to spend on "Department Store 
Type Merchandise (DSTM)". This projection assumes that the Lakehead 
region's consumer spending patterns do not diverge from the general 
Canadian patterns and concludes that: "The Lakehead region will by 1971 
be reaching levels of DSTM expenditures which were made elsewhere in 
Ontario in 1966. This breakthrough has been experienced in most major 
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Canadian cities within the past six to ten years and we are of the 
opinion that the Lakehead is presently going through this phase" (W. 
W. Urban Consultants, 1969:22). 
On this basis W.W. Urban recommends that approximately 100,000 
square feet of retail space be developed in the urban renewal 
area to meet the needs of consumers for department store type 
merchandise. 
The original projection of increased demand for retail floor 
space was amended in a 1971 letter to a firm associated with one of 
the major tenants in the proposed shopping complex, Sayvette. While 
acknowledging a "lack of recent material from which we derive our 
estimates" W.W. projects a further 25% increase in DSTM by 1972 
(W.W. Urban Consultants, June 25, 1971:1). 
The implicit and explicit assumption of the analysis by W.W. 
was that the additional retail floor space would be built in the 
Port Arthur urban renewal scheme. However, in the interim three 
suburban shopping malls were being developed in the city and would 
supply in excess of 250,000 square feet of retail floor space. 
To reconcile the need to legitimate the intensification of 
commercial redevelopment in the urban renewal scheme with the reality 
of the additional suburban retail floor space W.W. projected a dis- 
tribution of DTSM consumer expenditures which indicated an increase 
of consumer expenditures in the Port Arthur central business district 
and a decline in expenditures in all other areas in Thunder Bay. 
In short, the Port Arthur urban renewal scheme would attract consumers 
from all areas of the city, thereby causing other retail locations 
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to lose business (W.W. Urban Consultants, 1969 and W.W. Urban 
Consultants, June 25, 1971). 
The final effort at legitimating the intensification of 
commercial redevelopment in the urban renewal area was a 1972 report 
by W.W. A new method of projecting DSTM sales is introduced in this 
report. Given that Thunder Bay incomes are 97% of the Ontario average, 
DSTM sales will also be 97% of the Ontario average (W.W. Urban 
Consultants, Oct. 5, 1972:8). This assumption by W.W. neglects to 
mention that their previous analysis had stated that Thunder Bay 
DSTM sales were only 70% of the Ontario average. 
The increase in market share indicated for the new shopping centre 
is attributed to three factors: 
(1) A recapture of retail expenditures now being 
made outside the Trade Area such as in the U.S.. 
(2) The attraction of a certain percentage of Trade 
Area growth in expenditures and 
(3) A limited transfer of sales from existing Thunder 
Bay retail facilities (W.W. Urban Consultants, Oct. 
5, 1972:131). 
The first factor remains an assertion and is unsubstantiated by any 
method. The second factor relies upon the questionable assumptions 
discussed above. The final factor remains an informed guess. 
In the design document which the developer of the renewal scheme 
brought to Council for approval in principle in October of 1970 the 
W.W. argument is reproduced in a section entitled, "Economic and 
Market Studies". 
"Following a period of relative inactivity in the retail sphere 
in the Lakehead area during the 1960's, Thunder Bay retailers have 
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been experiencing a marked upsurging in consumer spending par- 
ticularly during the last two years. Although realized at a some- 
what later date here, this trend has been apparent elsewhere through- 
out Canada, especially in the larger Metropolitan Centres" (Headway 
Corporation et al., Oct. 15, 1970). The Council accepted this logic, 
a logic which was to prove extremely profitable for the developer, 
and approved the design. 
The final step in the legitimation of the 'new' urban renewal 
scheme was to sanitize the Offical Plan. Fortuitously at the time of 
the original W.W. report the Official Plan was in draft form and had 
not been finally approved by the Ontario Municipal Board. A com- 
parison of the Draft Plan with the Approved Plan will reveal the 
machinations of the local state managers. 
The draft version of the Plan of 1970 included two appendices, 
"Economic and Population Growth" and "Demand for Retail Facilities" 
(Proctor, Redfern, Dousfield and Bacon, 1970). Both these appendices 
are absent in the final version of the Plan. In examining the content 
of the appendices we note that they address the critical issue of 
retail floor space and conclude that: 
"If too much potential floor space is projected 
and allocated to the wrong areas then the Urban 
Renewal Schemes will fail" (Appendix B, p. 12); 
"little potential for future development beyond 
that of the Redwood District Shopping Centre 
(Northwood Park Plaza) up to 1981, by which time 
much of the Port Arthur Urban Renewal Scheme is 
to be completed" (Appendix C, p. 19). 
These statements and the clauses in the plan which addressed the 
issue of retail floor space and in particular the development of 
- 80 - 
additional suburban malls were expurgated or amended. 
The most significant amendment to the draft plan was the 
redefinition of policy on regional shopping centres. In the 1970 
version of the Plan the policy is "...to prohibit further regional 
shopping centres.unless an amendment to the Plan is prepared" 
(Proctor, Redfern, Bousfield and Bacon, 1970 p.l3). In the 1971 
version of the plan it has become "...consistent with the objectives 
of the Official Plan to consider further regional shopping centres..." 
(Proctor, Redfern, Bousfield and Bacon, 1971, S.2.5.2). 
Further, the requirements for justifying the necessity of 
additional retail floor space have been relaxed such that no pop- 
ulation or income projections are required and it is not necessary 
to prove that no detrimental effects will be experienced by existing 
centres. Instead, the approved version of 1971 refers to "an economic 
study prepared by the developer will satisfy, in the opinion of Council 
the feasibility of a further regional shopping centre" (Proctor, 
Redfern, Bousfield and Bacon, S.2.5.3). The operative phase being 
'the opinion of Council'. 
The original urban renewal scheme was supplanted by the Headway 
proposal, "Thunder Bay Urban Renewal Project - Port Arthur Ward" which 
concluded the process of redefining the intent of urban renewal. The 
Headway submission is not comparable to the original renewal scheme 
in that it is not a planning study but an archictect's description of 
the physical layout of the proposed shopping centre (Headway Cor- 
poration et. al., Oct. 15, 1970). The Headway proposal ignores the 
requirement of the developer selection committee that market studies 
be done and presents no evidence that any consultations with either 
the Planning Board or the City Planning Department had taken place 
(Urban Renewal Commission, Developer Selection and Project Imple- 
mentation Procedures, n.d.). The local state managers, W.W. Urban 
Consultants and Headway Corporation had successfully transformed 
urban renewal into an intensification of commercial accumulation 
in the urban core. 
This redefinition of the original intent of urban renewal did 
not go unchallenged. The Thunder Bay Citizen's Association presented 
evidence at the Ontario Municipal Board hearing which called into 
question the amendments of the original urban renewal scheme and the 
draft Official Plan. Professor David Nowlan testified that the W.W. 
analysis was wrought with errors of logic and technique and factually 
unreliable (Colbourne, 1972). 
The City called Mr. Hamilton of W.W. who replied by producing 
the 1972 report and discounted the 1969 report as obsolete and 
the 1971 letter as unreliable as it was written by a junior member of 
the firm (Colbourne, 1972). In the Board decision the logic of 
capital was accepted: 
"The Board finds it difficult to assume that all of the 
private sector accepted the W.W. analysis without 
question and did not apply its own judgement...The issue 
of need for additional commercial uses is really a 
peripheral issue in this application. There is no 
question that there will be some effect on existing 
businesses. It is generally more appropriate that the 
market place should determine the amount of commercial 
land uses within the overall concept of planning for the 
City, The Board has never set itself up as an economic 
arbiter to say when there is enough competition" (Ontario 
Municipal Board, Mar. 14, 1973:8). 
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The focal point of the opposition to the Thunder Bay urban 
renewal scheme was the socialization of the cost of the parking 
garage by the State and the privatization of profits by Headway 
Corporation. 
In the initial Headway redevelopment proposal there was no 
reference to which party would own or lease the parking garage 
which formed the physical base of the renewal structure. At some 
point in time it was decided by the developer and the state managers 
that Headway would construct the parking garages at a cost to the 
State of 1.2 million dollars. The garages would be operated by the 
Municipal Parking Authority as a segment of the local parking system. 
The monies necessary for the construction of the parking garage would 
be raised by the issuing of debentures. 
The 1.2 million dollar debenture issue required 0MB approval. 
This legal requirement allowed opponents to the urban renewal scheme 
to file objections to the proposed debenture with the 0MB. After 
objections were received by the Board a public hearing regarding the 
matter in question would be held. 
The key issue for the opposition to the proposed debenture was 
the profitability of the parking garage. Of secondary concern were 
the design of the structure and the reasonableness of 1.2 million 
dollar construction costs. 
In the controversy which was created around the parking garage 
issue no less than six documents were released by the State to 
legitimate the decision to proceed with the construction and operation 
plan outlined above. 
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The "Report on Urban Renewal Negotiations" by city financial 
adviser James F. Harris states that the predicted deficit of the 
parking garages would result in a less than fair return on investment 
for the developer; fair return on investment being defined as llJ^^o 
per annum. Further, Headway would be required to purchase the land 
on which the parking garages would be built thus increasing the 
Corporation's capital requirements for the project. 
In a letter which considers the City's options of building or 
leasing the parking structure, urban renewal director R. Tuokko 
asserts that "The urban renewal developer would be very pleased to 
have the committment of the City to fund the cost of the parking 
structures. This would relieve it (the developer) of an onorous 
financing task (Tuokko, Oct. 19, 1971). It would appear that 
capital requirements and the necessity of a fair return on investment 
for the developer were critical in determining the state managers' 
decision regarding the parking garage. 
The proposed lease agreement guaranteed the developer an 11% 
return on an initial investment of 1.2 million dollars. The sixty- 
six year lease would cost the City approximately 5 million dollars. 
By comparison the debenture issue would result in a 3.5 million 
expenditure over the 20 year retirement period. 
On the surface it would appear that the rational choice for state 
policy makers was to proceed by way of the debenture issue thereby 
"saving" 1.5 million dollars. However, these "choices" represent 
a false dichotomy in that they preclude the choice of having the 
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developer build and operate the garages. By presenting the public 
with the lease or build option state managers had neglected to mention 
that it was implicit in both choices that the City would operate the 
garages. Unfortunately the parking garages could not be operated at 
a profit. Herein lies the major subsidization of capital accumulation 
by the State. 
The urban renewal scheme was not economically viable without the 
provision of parking. As Mayor Laskin stated in the Times Journal, 
"Eatons and Sayvette will spend their money in other places than 
Thunder Bay if they are required to construct their own parking 
facilities (Times-Journal, Feb. 12, 1972). 
In essence what confronted the local state was a legitimation 
crisis. The state managers responded to the threat of a strike by 
capital by acceding to Headway's demand that the City build and operate 
the parking garage. The state behaved much in the manner described 
by Offe in that it accepted the mandate to sustain and create the 
conditions for accumulation to take place in the urban core. At the 
same time state managers acted to conceal the fact that the construction 
and operation of the parking garage was a massive public subsidization 
of private profitmaking. Those groups who opposed the renewal scheme 
attempted to reveal the capitalist nature of state. 
The state managers were not unaware of the financial implications 
of their actions. A series of reports were commissioned by the Parking 
Authority and the City to determine the costs of operating the proposed 
parking garages. 
The initial report was prepared by the firm Read Voorhees. The 
assumption of a 30(t/hr. parking rate by Read Voorhees in their analysis 
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was politically unpalatable to the Parking Authority. Deleuw 
Gather and Co. of Toronto were commissioned to provide a second 
opinion on the parking garage proposal. The Deleuw Gather report 
focuses on the displacement of on and off street parking by the 
proposed parking garages. The loss of 270 off street parking spaces 
and 37 on street parking spaces is only marginally offset by the 450 
new spaces in the parking garage. In other words the parking garage 
creates 143 new parking spaces at a cost of 1.2 million dollars. 
In conclusion Deleuw and Gather find the parking garage proposal 
a "somewhat inefficient design" of "excessive cost" (Deleuw and 
Gather and Co.) and recommended that it not be implemented. The 
critical problem identified by Deleuw and Gather is the undersupply 
of parking created by the urban renewal scheme. 
The state managers responded to the Deleuw-Cather report by 
holding a meeting on Sept. 7, 1971 which was attended by Headway 
Corporation, the City, the Parking Authority and the Architects and 
Consultants. Deleuw and Gather as the Parking Authority's consultant 
brought in an additional expert, Mr. Walker from the firm Parking 
Design and Development Ltd. 
The analysis of Mr. Walker in a report entitled Parking Design 
and Development revealed the extent to which the state was to sub-- 
sidize capital accumulation. After commenting on design inefficiencies 
such as the separation of the two garages, the depression of the 
garages below street level and the 20' bay widths he notes a rather 
curious fact: the parking garages are integrated into and support 
the mall. It would appear that the 20' bay width and the "unusual 
and daring concept" of putting cars at ground level result in con- 
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fusion about which party should bear the costs. The state by 
building and operating the parking garage which supports the mall 
has significantly reduced the developers construction costs. An 
analagous situation would be a case where the government agreed to 
build the basement of a single family dwelling free of charge to 
encourage the construction of housing. 
However, the primary concern of Walker's report is the economic 
viability of the parking garage operation. In Walker's opinion 
the proposed garage will incur significant operating deficits unless 
Headway contributes to the construction and operation costs of the 
garages. In conclusion Walker recommends a complete redesign of 
the renewal scheme. 
State managers acting under the duress of a potential withdrawal 
by the developer could not accept the conclusions of Walker or Deleuw 
Gather, In a letter J. Hariris, City Financial Advisor revealed the 
'real politik' of the situation: 
"While I accept the general validity of your 
comments...the present background is such that 
we are obliged to adopt the existing parking 
policies as the only realistic basis on which 
to work. It will be up to the policy author- 
ities of the City to provide justification. 
My interest is in promoting the viability of 
the urban renewal project (James Harris, 
April 11, 1972). 
The strategy of the "policy authorities" of the state was to hide 
the deficit of the parking garages through some creative accounting. 
The first step in this process of deficit erasure was to exempt the 
parking garages from taxes of $50,000 per year. Financial advisor, 
Harris had noted in a letter dated September 24, 1971, to Mr. Tuokko 
that the projected operating deficit of the parking garages 
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approximates the municipal taxes that would normally be paid by 
the parking garages (Harris, Sept. 24, 1971). Urban Renewal Director 
Tuokko appreciated Harris's analysis and in a memorandum dated Sept. 
27, 1971 states: "We agree that obviously (Deleuw Gather) had 
overestimated on all expenditures, so if the Parking Authority is 
granted exemptions of $50,000 from taxes they would operate at a 
profit (Tuokko, Sept. 27, 1971). 
Up until this point the public was unaware of the City's 
intentions regarding the urban renewal scheme and the proposed 
parking garages. But, in January of 1972 the City applied to the 
0MB for permission to dispense with a vote of the electors on the 
question of whether a 1.2 million debenture issue whould be undertaken 
to pay for the garages. With the disclosure of what was to the public 
a significant change in the urban renewal scheme it is not surprising 
that several individuals filed objections with the Board thereby re- 
quiring a hearing into the matter. 
In the press. Urban Renewal Director, Tuokko and Mayor Laskin 
asserted that the parking structure cost would not affect the general 
tax rate and that the operation would break even or make a profit 
(News Chronicle, Jan. 28, 1972 and April 5, 1972). To legitimate 
the policy the state managers called upon the firm of Read Voorhees. 
The "Read Voorhees Letter" wfn'ch reanalyzes the operating costs 
of the parking garages is in blatant contradiction with the initial 
Read Voorhees Report. In the initial Read Voorhees Report parking 
rental revenues are projected at $138,000 (Read, Voorhees, and 
Associates, 1970, p.8). The Read Voorhees Letter estimates parking 
revenue at $156,000 (Read, Voorhees and Associates, April 30, 1972, 
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p. 3). We may wonder from whence this $18,000 appeared. 
A critical phrase in the Read Voorhees Letter states: "based 
-on experience in other garages and parking habits in Thunder Bay, 
we estimate the parking revenue at $156,000" (Read, Voorhees and 
Associates, April 30, 1972, p. 3). It would appear that the 
original Read Voorhees report had underestimated the parking habits 
of Thunder Bay residents and neglected to consider the experiences 
of other parking garages. What is even more surprising is that the 
letter goes on to assert that at "peak usage" after five or six 
years, annual revenues of $190,000 may be expected (Read, Voorhees 
and Associates, April 30, 1972, p. 4). A further $34,000 in revenues 
are projected to appear as we would assume that residents increase 
their parking habits. 
Even with the amendment of the original Read Voorhees projections 
the parking garage is still predicted to operate at a deficit. In 
order to eliminate the operating deficit two further measures were 
necessary. First, Read Voorhees created the category "other revenue". 
Adopting Renewal Director Tuokko's suggestion $55,000 of "other 
revenue" was generated by the exemption of the parking garage from 
municipal taxation. Secondly, the taxes paid on stores and buildings 
over the garage of $107,000 were considered "other revenue". These 
creative accounting measures were legitimated by an argument from 
the Authority: "We discussed the inclusion of these payments and 
income with our economist and it was. his view that these additional 
economic benefits should be part of the total cost benefits structure" 
(Read, Voorhees and Associates, April 30, 1972, p. 5). It is amusing 
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to note that a memorandum of the September 7, 1971 meeting of 
Headway, the City, the Parking Authority and the Architects and 
Consultants had originally discussed the idea that the taxation 
revenue from the stores in the Mall would offset the parking garage 
deficit (W. Mokomela, Sept. 7, 1971). 
Perhaps the Read Voorhees economist was an associate of noted 
economic theoretician Mayor Laskin who optimistically suggested 
at the September 7, 1971 meeting, "...that the $75,000 figure was 
really an investment and that the end result would be a $300,000 
profit in the long run" (W. Mokomela, Sept. 7, 1971). 
The Read Voorhees letter was only the initial shot in the 
campaign of state managers to legitimate their decision to proceed 
with the Headway urban renewal proposal. In fact one can only 
decipher the process of legitimation in retrospect. The original 
Read Voorhees Report, the Deleuw Cather Report, the Parking Design 
and Development Report, the Deleuw Cather Letter and the Read Voorhees 
Letter only became public documents after the May, 1972 municipal 
elections when they were obtained by sympathetic aldermen and leaked 
to the Thunder Bay Citizens Association. 
The first public attempt by state managers to legitimize the 
decision to proceed with the Headway renewal scheme was made at a public 
meeting of City Council on May 3, 1972. A document entitled "Cost 
Benefit Analysis" was distributed at the meeting. 
The "Cost Benefit Analysis" presented by the local state managers 
compares the cash costs of the renewal scheme with the cash benefits 
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the scheme will produce. Benefits are defined primarily in terms 
of tax revenues generated by the new shopping centre. The major 
costs are the municipality's urban renewal investment, the parking 
garage construction costs, the lost taxes on urban renewal lands 
and the annual debt payment. 
The initial criticism one can make of the "Cost Benefit 
Analysis" is the failure to consider the expenditures of the prov- 
incial and federal government which represent 7.2 million dollars 
or 75% of all monies expended on urban renewal. The local state 
managers had defined the political question as one of whether the 
City would realize significant revenues and had excluded consideration 
of other levels of state expenditures. 
The Cost Benefit Analysis reproduces the logic of the Read 
Voorhees letter and projects parking revenues in the first year of 
$130,000, rising to a plateau of $190,000. Operating expenses are 
estimated at $60,000 per year. Retirement of the $1.2 million deben- 
ture issue will require annual payments of $127,000 for a 20 year 
period, and an interim financing debt will be incurred over 20 years 
at the rate of $3,900 per year. The Parking Authority will pay 
$55,000 in annual taxes to the Municipality for the parking garages. 
The final revenue generating aspect of the garages are what is known 
as air rights. Air rights are rental monies paid by the developer 
to the municipality in recognition of the fact that the parking 
garage supports the mall structure and will amount to $27,000 annually 
(City of Thunder Bay, Cost Benefit Analysis, May, 1972). 
Using the figures provided in the Cost Benefit Analysis the parking 
- 91 
garages will incur an $88,000 deficit in the first year declining to 
$28,900 per year in the fifth year. By the time the 1.2 million 
dollar debenture is retired a deficit in access of $700,000 will have 
been incurred by the local state. Given our previous discussion of 
the questionable assumptions of the Read Voorhees letter this projected 
deficit is a conservative estimate. 
The opposition to the urban renewal scheme coalesced at a sur- 
prise City Council meeting on July 10, 1972. The meeting was called 
to consider the By-laws authorizing the Headway proposal to proceed. 
The Thunder Bay Citizens Association presented a brief which opposed 
the Headway proposal on grounds similar to the argument presented 
here (Thunder Bay Citizen's Association, "Study on Urban Renewal", 
July 10, 1972). The Citizen's presentation centred on the operating 
deficit of the parking garage and was supported by statements made by 
transportation consultant Arthur Read. The Chronicle Journal of 
July 14, 1972 counterposed the remarks of Mr. Read and Mayor Laskin. 
"Statements made previously by both elected 
and appointed officials concerning profit- 
able operating revenue expected from the 
underground facility, appeared to be contra- 
dicted by transportation consultant Arthur 
Read. Mr. Read said operating losses would 
be "staggering" but the facility is the 
same as any other public service...which the 
taxpayer has become accustomed to subsidizing." 
"Mayor Laskin when questioned today said he 
had no knowledge of any elected or appointed 
official ever being quoted as saying the 
planned 1.2 million dollar parking complex 
in the urban renewal mall would be a profit- 
able operation. It was no secret we expected 
to lose moneyl the Mayor remarked." 
The initial legitimation strategy of the state managers of concealing 
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public losses failed as a result of the unanticipated election of the 
reform councillors and the forming of the opposition group, the Thunder 
Bay Citizen's Association. The Citizen's Association objections to 
the Ontario Municipal Board would necessitate a public hearing and 
hence a more sophisticated legitimation strategy.on the part of 
state managers. The opposition to the renewal scheme had pointed 
out that the parking garage deficits would put the municipal Parking 
Authority into a debt position in contravention of the Municipal 
Act. 
The legitimation strategy of the local state managers would not 
have been called into question without the intervention of the reform 
councillors and the Thunder Bay Citizen's Association. Their object- 
ions called into question the legality of the state managers legit- 
imation strategy and hence required the local state to formulate a 
more sophisticated justification of their policies. 
The cosmetic elimination of the parking garage operating deficit 
by an emphasis on the overall tax benefits of the renewal scheme and 
the exemption of the facility from municipal taxation would not meet 
the legal criteria of the Municipal Board. Thus a new strategy was 
formulated whereby the entire parking rate structure of the City would 
be increased and the parking garages would be exempt from taxation 
to preclude the possibility of a Parking Authority deficit (Parking 
Authority, July 25, 1972). This document was hastily withdrawn, how- 
ever, and the matter of increased parking rates was scheduled for con- 
sideration at a City Council meeting on August 15, 1972. 
During the interim it became apparent that there was confusion 
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among the Parking Authority officials and elected aldermen regarding 
the Parking Authority report. On August 11th, the Chairman of the 
Parking Authority was quoted in the Chronicle Journal as saying that 
the parking garage would be exempt from taxes. In the course of the 
next three days the Chairman's position had shifted considerably. 
In the August 14th report of the Parking Authority no mention is 
made of the tax subsidy. At the August 15th City Council meeting the 
motion to increase city parking meter rates passed 8 to 5 (Chronicle 
Journal, August 16, 1972). 
In a final political subterfuge the parking rate increase was 
considered by Council in by-law form on September 17, 1972. The sub- 
terfuge is revealed in the fact that the parking rate by-law was not 
on the published meeting agenda and it was known prior to the meeting 
that opponents of the parking rate increase would not be present. 
The by-law passed by a 5-3 margin (Colbourne, September 27, 1981). 
In the 'public' realm the legitimation strategy of concealing 
the operating deficits of the parking garage by emphasizing the tax 
benefits of the shopping mall may have succeeded. But in the legal 
realm of the Municipal Board the possibility of a Parking Authority 
deficit or the exemption of the parking garage from municipal taxes 
was precluded. 
The Thunder Bay Citizen's Association filed an objection to the 
renewal scheme with the Ontario Municipal Board. By filing an 
objection and requiring a public hearing the association had tacitly 
accepted that the conflict would be resolved within the boundaries 
defined by that particular state apparatus. 
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The Citizen's Association presentation relied upon the evidence 
released by the reform councillors discussed above and the expert 
testimony of Mr. Walker the author of the critical Parking Design 
and Development Report. 
Mr. Walker's testimony attacked the design of the parking garage 
as obsolete and sustained the Citizen's Association contention that 
the garages would be a financial liability to the City. Both of 
these criticisms had been elaborated in Walker's previous report 
and the Citizen's Association brief and were unsurprising. What was 
surprising was his assertion that the 1.2 million dollar cost of the 
parking garage was over inflated by $400,000 dollars. 
To support this new element of the Citizen's Association case 
against the renewal scheme further expert testimony was required. 
The Association called upon Mr. T.A. Jones a local contractor and 
former alderman. Mr. Jones stated that his firm could construct the 
parking garages at a cost of $800,000 and still manage a sufficient 
margin of profit. 
The Walker-Jones testimony points up a difficulty which all 
citizens groups or individuals opposing particular state policy actions 
face. In the case of the cost estimate for the parking garages the 
state managers had legitimated their cost estimate by reference to an 
'expert' opinion by the firm of J.V. Fitzgerald and Associates 
(J. V. Fitzgerald and Associates, Jan. 21, 1972). The Citizen's Assoc- 
iation lacking any independent assessment of the Fitzgerald estimate had 
accepted the validity of the estimate and proceeded on this assumption. 
Were it not for the election of the reform councillors, 
the original Walker report would 
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never have become public knowledge and Walker would never have 
appeared as a Citizen’s Association witness to call into question 
the validity of the cost estimate. The structural imbalance in the 
access to expertise or information, whereby the state managers have 
both the money and the time to legitimate decisions by appeal to 
'experts', precludes the possibility of effective opposition to 
state decisions. Only when the opponents of state policies have 
equal access to the resources of state managers, as in the case of 
funded public participation, is there a possibility of a 'just' 
hearing. 
The City called Mr. Read of Read Voorhees and Associates, the 
authors of the infamous "Read Voorhees Letter" and chief apologists 
for city policy, to refute the Walker-Jones testimony. The argument 
Read presented was simple, he saw the proposed parking plan as 
"reasonable" and he disagreed with the criticisms of Mr. Walker. 
The hearing had established that the 'experts' disagreed. It was 
the Board's responsibi1ity to adjudicate the dispute between the 
'experts‘. 
The Municipal Board decision represents an example of what Offe 
defined as the internal crisis management strategies of the state. In 
this instance the board decision acts to filter out not only non- 
capitalist interest, but also to protect the two million dollars already 
expended by the state. Acting under the auspices of the dire consequences 
theory of adjudication the board produced a classic example of legitimating 
"official" discourse, a key weapon in the crisis management arsenal of 
the state. 
In the preamble to the decision the Board defined urban renewal as 
...a new form of public/private partnership,...with the municipality's 
role being primarily catalytic, in that it would improve the environment 
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to promote the participation of private capital" (Ontario Municipal 
Board, Mar. 14, 1973, p. 2). The catalyst in this instance being 
in excess of 7 million dollars from the 3 levels of the state which 
acted to subsidize the private accululation of capital. 
By the conclusion of the Board decision, the necessity of state 
intervention in the determination of commercial land use had been 
rejected: "It is generally more appropriate that the market place 
should determine the amount of commercial land uses within the overall 
concept of planning for the city" (Ontario Municipal Board, March 14, 
1972, p. 8). The state in undertaking urban renewal was attempting 
to alter the existing commercial land use structure. Urban renewal was 
a response to an undesirable structure of commercial land uses, yet 
the Board decision asserts the proposition that the market- 
place should determine the amount of commercial land uses in the city 
and its negation that a new form of public/private partnership is to 
be required. 
The Board decision is not limited to the dialectical strategy 
of advancing thesis and antithesis but moves on to the firmer ground 
of argument by exclusion. The majority of the decision's text con- 
stitutes a rejection of the issues raised by the Citizen's Association. 
For example: 
"The objections raised relative to this issue 
are therefore not relevant" p. 3. 
"It is the municipal prerogative to determine 
their priorities of spending, which the Board 
will not interfere with" p. 5. 
0 
"The Board does not have under review the re- 
development plan to consider certain social 
problems as suggested" p. 6. 
"The Board does not determine the validity 
of the by-laws..." p. 6. 
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The strategy of the Board appears to be one of narrowing the 
issues in contention thereby excluding the majority of the oppositions' 
arguments. Thus the Board does not accept or reject the validity of 
the Citizen's Association arguments but merely deems them irrelevant. 
The Board confined its decision to considering four major 
issues: the ownership and operation of the parking garages, the cost 
of the parking garages, the design of the garage and the financial 
viability of the Parking Authority. 
In considering the City's decision to construct and operate the 
parking garages the Board accepted the false dichotomy that the City's 
choice was between building and leasing the garages. By excluding 
the possibility that the developer would build and operate the garages 
the Board was able to state that they were... "satisfied... that the 
change to retain ownership in the municipality...was not at the instance 
of the developer. In fact, the figures submitted would indicate that 
the procedure now adopted would be more financially beneficial to the 
municipality..." (Ontario Municipal Board, March 14, 1973, p. 6). 
The Board adjudicated the conflict between the experts regarding the 
cost and design of the garages in favor of the City dismissing the 
Walker-Jones testimony as follows: 
"Conflicting opinions were expressed as to what 
should be the appropriate cost. The Board is 
satisfied that...the cost of $1,200,000 represents 
a reasonable sum." 
"The assertion that there is an obsolescence factor 
has not been demonstrated for this particular 
building" (Ontario Municipal Board, March 14, 1973, 
p. 7). 
The final issue under consideration was the operating deficit of 
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the parking garages and the relationship of this deficit to the 
finances of the Parking Authority. Again the criticisms of those 
who opposed the scheme were rejected as the Board accepted the 
legitimation strategy of the local state, concluding that: 
"The Parking Authority has sufficient reserve funds, 
particularly if parking rates are increased as pro- 
posed, to handle the situation during the early years 
when costs will exceed revenues. Looking at the 
matter, not in isolation, but in its overall context 
including increased taxation, and with the expected 
rejuvenation of the urban renewal area, the Board 
accepts the prognosis of the municipality in favour 
of that of Mr. Walker" (Ontario Municipal Board, 
March 14, 1973, p. 7). 
Is it not a contradiction to state: "Certainly it is to 
some extent a speculative exercise to determine revenue and expenses 
in advance" (Ontario Municipal Board, March 14, 1973, p. 7) and 
then accept the 'prognosis of the municipality'! If revenue pro- 
jection is speculation why must the Board accept the speculation 
of the municipality when the 'rejuvenation of the urban renewal area' 
is not assured but merely 'expected'. 
If urban renewal was to have been successfully opposed that 
opposition would have been required at the inception of the scheme. 
To object after the urban renewal lands had been cleared and over 2 
million dollars expended by the state was too late. In the diabolical 
dialectic of the Board which asserts that the 'market' should deter- 
mine land use in the city while rejecting arguments as to the com- 
mercial viability of state intervention urban protest is a zero sum 
game. As is explicitly stated in the Board decision, "The Board 
has never set itself up as an economic arbiter to say when there is 
enough competition" (Ontario Municipal Board, 1973, p. 8). 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion 
The blight which initiated urban renewal was the decline of 
property values in the Port Arthur central business district. The 
local state, using the legal powers of eminent domain expropriated 
land owners in the urban core in order to replace the extensive form 
of petite bourgeois shop owner capital accumulation with an intensive 
monopoly capital form of accumulation. In this process the state 
acted to subsidize capital by reducing the cost of land assembly and 
through the construction of necessary infrastructure for the new 
development. This state intervention was legitimated by the 1,000 
new jobs and increased property tax revenues that urban renewal would 
bring. 
The crux of urban renewal became the extent to which the state would 
subsidize capital in the redevelopment of the city core. In other 
words the extent to which the state would supplement or replace the 
market through the provision of what we have defined abo^e as devalorized 
capital money advanced to capital without the expectation that the money 
will realize an average rate of return. 
The structure of the state creates the precondition for the 
"appearance" of an instrumental relationship between the state and capital. 
The local state's lack of financial autonomy created a structure whereby 
the local state attempted to maximize property tax revenues. The 
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maximization of property tax revenues implies a support for high 
density forms of urban development such as shopping malls and high 
rises. Further, if legislation exists to provide federal and 
provincial cost sharing for the construction of infrastructure 
necessary to support high density development, then it is not 
surprising that the local state vn"ll advocate urban renewal programmes. 
When Headway "captured" the local state that capture represented 
a structurally induced instrumentality. The local state could not 
become Headway's instrument without the structural preconditions of 
the British North America Act, the National Housing Act, the Municipal 
Act and the Planning Act. 
In the case of the Thunder Bay urban renewal project the issue of 
the autonomy of state action is not in contention. It is clear that 
the decision to accept the Headway redefinition of the urban renewal 
plan disproportionately benefited capital. The acceptance by the local 
state of the Headway renewal scheme presents evidence to any claim 
that urban renewal was an autonomous official action. 
In the acceptance of capital's definition of what constitutes 
urban renewal one could make a case for an instrumental theory of 
the state, but, this would be to fail to consider two critical factors: 
first, that a legislative framework for urban renewal had existed 
since 1954 and second, the initial proposal for an urban renewal 
scheme had been initiated by the local state managers. 
The legislative framework for urban renewal in Canada created 
a state organizational structure which constrained and directed the 
- 101 
outcomes of local state action. Without the financial participation 
of the federal and provincial governments and the legal mechanisms 
of the Provincial Planning Act the local state could not initiate 
urban renewal. Urban renewal was a reaction to an existing state 
structure. Further, without the approval of the Ontario Municipal 
Baord the Headway renewal scheme would never have become a reality. 
Second, there is no evidence that Headway influenced the initial 
planning process which defined the inner city core as blighted and 
hence led the local state managers to apply for an urban renewal 
scheme. This renewal application represents the response of the 
local state to an existing state policy structure. 
It would appear that what is required to explain the actions 
of the state and capital is an integrated theory of the relationship 
of instrumentalism and structuralism. The renewal scheme is an 
example at one level of the instrumental theory of the state. But 
that instrumentality is predicated upon the existence of particular 
forms of state structure and organization. That structure and organiz- 
ation is a historical legacy which is not the product of the agency 
of a particular class but the outcome of the complex interaction of 
crises in capital accumulation, political struggles and legislative 
frameworks. 
The interests of state managers and a capitalist corporation 
coincided in the case of urban renewal. State managers expected the 
renewal scheme to eradicate blight, create jobs and increase state 
revenues. Headway expected urban renewal to generate high profits. 
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However, the Headway expectation of profitability was based upon 
a different renewal scheme than the one designed by the local state 
managers. Faced with a possible capital strike and given their 
financial committment to urban renewal local state managers redefined 
the scheme to fit the requirements of capital. This redefinition 
precipitated the protest of Citizens' Associations and began the 
war over urban renewal legitimation. 
The protest which mobilized in response to the level of state 
subsidization of capital reacted not only to the policy of urban 
renewal but also to the existing state structures. The focal point 
of the Citizens' Associations campaign was the Ontario Municipal 
Board hearing. By accepting that the conflict over urban renewal 
would be resolved within the existing state structures the outcome 
of protest was in a sense predetermined. The tactical choice of 
the Citizens' Association was to attempt to delegitimate the local 
state's rationale for urban renewal not to call into question the 
legitimacy of the state structure itself. Urban renewal became a 
struggle over the production of "truth". Dire consequences would 
result if, after state expenditures of in excess of two million dollars, 
urban renewal was halted or redefined. 
What this struggle of legitimation constituted was a politics 
of truth. Who was telling the truth? Whose truth would prevail? 
The local state and its agents the consulting firms produced documents 
to substantiate their claims regarding the costs and benefits of 
urban renewal. The Citizens' Association replied by attempting to 
deconstruct the "truth" produced by the local state, thereby revealing 
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the mendacious nature of the state's claims. The war of "truth" 
production was resolved in the Ontario Municipal Board hearing 
which affirmed the "truth" of local state's claims and thereby 
legitimated the policy of urban renewal. Thus the power of the 
state was exercised through the production of truth. 
One may ask where is the working class in this analysis, 
reply, absent. Urban renewal's primary impact on the working class 
was to alter their consumption patterns and increase their taxes. 
There is no evidence that the Citizens' Association had a working 
class base or any connection to working class organizations such as 
trade unions. The Citizens' Association's arguments regarding the 
costs and benefits of urban renewal were beyond the realm of working 
class discourse. At some level the Association's arguments about 
parking rates, debt load and property tax may have raised some concern 
in the populace but this was not reflected in a ground swell of 
public opposition. 
Why should the worker believe the Association and not the Mayor? 
What would it have taken to deligitimate the Mayor and the local 
state's position? In a sense it was out of the workers' hands. What 
did one know about how to oppose a local government policy? Probably 
next to nothing. For most were unaware of the state structures, the 
subordination of the local state or the existence of The Municipal 
Board. If one were to attend a Citizens' Association meeting it would 
be a foreign experience. Pointy headed lawyers, social workers, and 
engineering consultants speaking in a language which was not your own. 
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Vague abstractions pale before the promised bounty of 1,000 new 
jobs and a new shopping mall. Shopping malls and jobs are real 
but a debenture is a fantasy. This is a tale of the state and 
capital from which working class struggle is notable only in 
its absence. 
One may ask where does this analysis lead us to in terms of 
the Theory of the State? I think it has become clear that the 
possibility of a general Theory of the State is remote. The most 
fruitful exercise we can engage in is the application of 'general' 
concepts to particular historical contexts. No one case study 
refutes Poulantzas, for example. What is useful is to take Poulantzas' 
concepts such as the power block or relative autonomy and try to make 
them meaningful in some, dare I say, empirical manner. The debate 
between Miliband and Poulantzas or Block and Skocpol alerts us to 
the lacuna in both our theoretical and historical analysis thereby 
allowing us to create more complete explanations in our own work. 
It is unfortunate that much of the work being done on the Theory of 
the State has devolved into the creation of false dichotomies such 
as structural ism versus instrumentalism or empty language games. What 
is needed is a return to a more praxis and less ivory tower marxism 
which does not reproduce its political sectarianism in theoretical 
sectarianism. It is in this spirit of reconciliation that I have 
tried to criticize existing marxist theory in the attempt to more 
fully explain and understand urban renewal in Thunder Bay. 
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